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INTRODUCTION 
From 2006 through 2011, apprehensions of unauthorized 
immigrants by border patrol agents plummeted.1 While 
apprehension rates still remain at a historically low level, 
authorities have documented an uptick since 2012.2 Two 
categories of unauthorized immigrants have significantly 
contributed to the rising apprehension rates: those subject to 
expedited removal who claim to fear persecution and 
unaccompanied alien children (“UACs”).  
Expedited removal is a process created in 1996 that permits 
immigration authorities to summarily deport certain individuals 
apprehended at or near the border.3 The major exception to 
summary deportation is for those who demonstrate a credible 
fear of persecution or torture.4 Thus, “[t]he ‘credible fear’ process 
is in many cases the only mechanism that stands between an 
arriving asylum seeker and immediate deportation.”5 For UACs, 
immigration law provides certain processes and protections that 
curtail authorities’ ability to deport particular UACs quickly.6 
Any child without a parent or legal guardian is considered a 
UAC.7 
 
 1 JOHN F. SIMANSKI & LESLEY M. SAPP, OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. 
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2012, 
at 3 fig.1 (2013), available at http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ois_enfor 
cement_ar_2012_1.pdf. Apprehension rates are different than the number of distinct 
individuals apprehended because the same person could be apprehended multiple times 
in a given year.  
 2 U.S. BORDER PATROL, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., TOTAL ILLEGAL ALIEN 
APPREHENSIONS BY FISCAL YEAR (2014), available at http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/ 
media-resources/stats?title=Border+Patrol (providing apprehension rates in the 
southwestern border region from FY 1960 through FY 2013). 
 3 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (2012); see also 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b) (2014). 
 4 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(4). 
 5 Asylum Abuse: Is It Overwhelming Our Borders?: Hearing Before the Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 113th Cong. 143 (2013) [hereinafter Asylum Surge Hearing] (statement of 
ACLU et al.).  
 6 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1232(b)(3) (requiring enforcement agencies to transfer UACs 
to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services within seventy-two hours of 
apprehension).  
 7 The Homeland Security Act of 2002 defines an “unaccompanied alien child” as one 
who:  
(A) has no lawful immigration status in the United States;  
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After a gradual rise in claims for several years, the number 
of unauthorized immigrants claiming to credibly fear persecution 
spiked in the middle of 2012.8 The number of claims nearly 
tripled in fiscal year (“FY”) 2013 and the FY 2014 figures depict a 
comparably high rate.9 The increase in UAC border crossings 
rode the coattails of the surge in credible fear claims. 
Immigration authorities started to record a steady rise in UAC 
border crossings in 2012.10 By 2014, the staggering surge in UAC 
border crossings at the southwestern border began to gain 
national attention.11 The situation has been called a “disaster,”12 
a potential “national security threat,”13 and a “humanitarian 
crisis.”14 
Lawmakers have taken notice of the surges as well. The 
House Judiciary Committee held a series of hearings to assess 
whether migrants are abusing the credible fear process and 
ostensibly to identify the causes for the spike in credible fear 
claims.15 The UAC surge has also garnered congressional 
attention and led to hearings in the House.16  
 
(B) has not attained 18 years of age; and 
(C) with respect to whom— 
(i) there is no parent or legal guardian in the United States; or 
(ii) no parent or legal guardian in the United States is available to provide 
care and physical custody. 
6 U.S.C. § 279(g)(2) (2012).  
 8 Asylum Surge Hearing, supra note 5, at 227. 
 9 Id. (documenting 36,035 credible fear referrals in FY 2013, up from 13,880 
referrals the previous fiscal year); U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF 
HOMELAND SEC., CREDIBLE FEAR WORKLOAD SUMMARY FY 2014 (2014), available at 
http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Outreach/Notes%20from%20Previous%20E
ngagements/Asy-Credible-Reasonable-FearFY14-Q1.pdf [hereinafter USCIS 2014 
CREDIBLE FEAR STATISTICS] (documenting more than 20,000 referrals in the first half of 
FY 2014). 
 10 Southwest Border Unaccompanied Alien Children, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER 
PATROL, http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/southwest-border-unaccompanied-children 
(last visited Oct. 9, 2014). 
 11 Id.; e.g., Frances Robles, Wave of Minors on Their Own Rush to Cross Southwest 
Border, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2014, at A1; Richard Cowan, Waves of Immigrant Minors 
Present Crisis for Obama, Congress, REUTERS, May 28, 2014, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/28/us-usa-immigration-children-idUSKBN0E814T 
20140528. 
 12 An Administration Made Disaster: The South Texas Border Surge of 
Unaccompanied Alien Minors: Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 
154 (2014) [hereinafter UAC Surge Hearing].  
 13 Lindsey Boerma, Is the Surge of Illegal Child Immigrants a National Security 
Threat?, CBS NEWS (July 7, 2014, 5:42 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/is-the-surge-
of-illegal-child-immigrants-a-national-security-threat/. 
 14 Cowan, supra note 11. 
 15 See, e.g., Asylum Surge Hearing, supra note 5. 
 16 UAC Surge Hearing, supra note 12. 
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Explanations for the causes of these surges vary 
considerably. Some point to depressed economic opportunities 
and increased crime rates in the so-called Northern Triangle of 
El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala,17 which are the 
countries of origin for most of the migrants.18 Others fault the 
enforcement efforts and policy choices of the Obama 
Administration.19 Myriad derivations of these potential causes 
also permeate the discussion,20 adding to the difficulties in 
discerning the most likely causes of these surges. It is important, 
however, to identify these causes. The history of immigration is a 
collection of derivations on cyclical events and arguments 
presented as if they were entirely unprecedented. Whatever one’s 
beliefs about the optimal level and types of migration, 
immigration law and policy should be grounded in a greater 
understanding of the significance of the various push and pull 
factors that influence migratory patterns.  
This Article looks closer at the available data to try to 
identify the factors that have caused this extraordinary surge in 
border crossings by credible fear claimants and UACs. Part I 
provides an overview of expedited removal and the credible fear 
process before reviewing data on credible fear referral rates. Part 
II discusses the law that pertains to UACs and provides data to 
illustrate the extent of the surge in UAC border crossings. Part 
III will review the main factors that could be contributing to the 
surges.  
In Part IV, this Article will assess holistically the previously 
discussed causes and identify how several of them have 
converged to create the current crisis. In short, while individual 
 
 17 See Asylum Surge Hearing, supra note 5, at 94 (statement of Eleanor Acer, 
Director, Refugee Protection Program, Human Rights First) (arguing that violence and 
other “external factors . . . are the drivers of flight”); Tom K. Wong, Statistical Analysis 
Shows that Violence, Not Deferred Action, Is Behind the Surge of Unaccompanied 
Children Crossing the Border, CENTER FOR AM. PROGRESS (July 8, 2014), http://www.am 
ericanprogress.org/issues/immigration/news/2014/07/08/93370/statistical-analysis-shows-t 
hat-violence-not-deferred-action-is-behind-the-surge-of-unaccompanied-children-crossing-
the-border/. 
 18 See Southwest Border Unaccompanied Alien Children, supra note 10; Asylum 
Surge Hearing, supra note 5, at 61 (report of Ruth Ellen Wasem, Congressional Research 
Service). 
 19 See Asylum Surge Hearing, supra note 5, at 2 (statement of Rep. Bob Goodlatte) 
(opining that “word has gotten out as to the virtual rubberstamping of applications” by 
the administration); id. at 6–7 (statement of Rep. Jason Chaffetz) (blaming the 
ineffectiveness of immigration enforcement agencies).  
 20 See Wong, supra note 17, at 5–6 (using Mexican UAC migratory rates to negate 
the significance of the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization 
Act to the surge in UAC border crossings); Asylum Surge Hearing, supra note 5, at 2 
(statement of Rep. Bob Goodlatte) (attributing ICE’s “watered down” interpretation of its 
parole authority to the surge in credible fear claims). 
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circumstances vary, dire country conditions in the Northern 
Triangle further deteriorated in certain ways around the time of 
the surges. The continued deterioration increased the incentive 
to leave. Concurrently, specific U.S. laws, practices, and 
immigration policies—along with claims made by nefarious 
opportunists—led to some accurate and some misinformed 
perceptions that certain migrants have a greater chance to enter 
or remain in the United States. When these perceptions spread 
amidst deteriorating country conditions, it provided the spark 
that motivated a greater number of credible fear claimants and 
UACs to make the dangerous journey north.  
After reviewing these causes, this Article provides some brief 
concluding thoughts. Specifically, this Article suggests limited 
reforms that should not be contentious, and reviews how certain 
gaps in the available data impugn researchers’ ability to more 
fully discern the causes of migration.  
I. THE CREDIBLE FEAR PROCESS  
A.  Expedited Removal  
In 1996, Congress enacted the Illegal Immigration Reform 
and Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”).21 Prior to IIRIRA, 
inadmissible individuals apprehended by the government were 
placed into formal exclusion or deportation proceedings in an 
immigration court.22 IIRIRA amended the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (“INA”) to create a process to significantly 
accelerate the removal of many “arriving aliens.”23 Referred to as 
“expedited removal,” the procedure permits immigration 
inspectors within the U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
(“DHS”) to order that an individual be removed from the United 
States without providing that individual with an opportunity to 
have his or her case further reviewed by an immigration judge.24 
Specifically, IIRIRA authorizes immigration inspection officers to 
 
 21 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
 22 See id.; see also Peter L. Markowitz, Straddling the Civil-Criminal Divide: A 
Bifurcated Approach to Understanding the Nature of Immigration Removal Proceedings , 
43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 289, 289 n.2 (2008). 
 23 An “arriving alien” is 
an applicant for admission coming or attempting to come into the United 
States at a port-of-entry, or an alien seeking transit through the United 
States at a port-of-entry, or an alien interdicted in international or United 
States waters and brought into the United States by any means, whether 
or not to a designated port-of-entry, and regardless of the means of 
transport. 
8 C.F.R. §§ 1.1(q), 1001.1(q) (2014). 
 24 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (2012); see also 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b). 
Do Not Delete 2/15/2015 7:58 PM 
342 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 18:2 
summarily order the removal of arriving aliens who are 
inadmissible because they do not hold valid travel documents or 
because they obtained or attempted to obtain travel documents 
by fraud or misrepresentation.25 IIRIRA also provides DHS (as 
the successor to the Immigration and Naturalization Service on 
such matters)26 with authority to expand the classes of 
individuals who are subject to expedited removal.27 Among other 
expansions, expedited removal now applies to individuals 
apprehended within 100 miles of certain sectors of the northern 
and southern borders as long as authorities apprehend such 
individuals within fourteen days of their unlawful entry.28 
The number of individuals subject to expedited removal is 
significant. Between thirty and forty percent of all annual 
deportations in recent years have been through expedited 
removal.29 Between FYs 2010 and 2012, nearly 400,000 people 
were deported through the expedited removal process.30 In 2012, 
migrants from Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador 
comprised ninety-seven percent of all expedited removals.31 
B.  Fear of Persecution or Torture  
If applied without exception, the expedited removal process 
would thwart the United States’ obligation to not return to their 
home countries individuals with a legitimate fear of being 
persecuted or tortured. The United States is a signatory to the 
1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees.32 Known as the principle of non-refoulement, the 
Protocol prohibits states from repatriating individuals to 
countries from which they legitimately fear being persecuted.33 
 
 25 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (referring to the grounds of inadmissibility provided 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C), (a)(7)). “[C]itizens of Cuba arriving at a United States 
port-of-entry by aircraft” are not subject to expedited removal. 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(1)(i).  
 26 See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, §§ 1512(d), 1517, 116 
Stat. 2135, 2310–11 (indicating that certain references to the Attorney General in 
immigration statutes and regulations now pertain to the Secretary of DHS). 
 27 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii) (limiting the agency’s expansion authority to aliens 
who have not been admitted or paroled into the United States and have not been 
continuously present in the United States for two years). 
 28 69 Fed. Reg. 48,876, 48,877–81 (Aug. 11, 2004); 67 Fed. Reg. 68,923, 68,923–26 
(Nov. 13, 2002); 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b).  
 29 SIMANSKI & SAPP, supra note 1, at 5 tbl.6. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. at 5. 
 32 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 
Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (entered into force Nov. 1, 1968).  
 33 Id. art. 33. 
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Congress subsequently enacted the Refugee Act of 1980, which 
codified this obligation.34  
The Refugee Act provides that individuals are eligible for 
asylum relief if they satisfy the definition of a refugee.35 
Applicants can establish they are refugees by demonstrating that 
they fear they will be persecuted on account of race, religion, 
nationality, political opinion, or social group.36 The definition also 
requires that asylum applicants demonstrate that the 
governments in their home countries are either responsible for 
the persecution, or unable or unwilling to curtail the actions of 
non-governmental actors.37  
Applicants who apply for asylum are also assumed to be 
applying for withholding of removal.38 The requirements for 
establishing eligibility for withholding of removal under the INA 
are largely comparable to the prerequisites for asylum.39 There 
are, however, several differences.40 Withholding of removal 
implements the government’s non-refoulement obligation by 
requiring that the government does not deport eligible applicants 
to the countries from which they fear harm.41 While withholding 
of removal prohibits repatriation to the persecuting country, it 
does not provide the applicant with an opportunity to become a 
legal permanent resident.42 Asylum, by contrast, does provide 
such adjustment benefits, and for that reason it is discretionary; 
the Attorney General does not have to provide applicants with 
asylum relief even if they demonstrate eligibility.43  
The United States is also a signatory to the Convention 
Against Torture (“CAT”).44 In 1999, the Attorney General 
 
 34 Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified in scattered 
sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
 35 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (2012). 
 36 Id. § 1101(a)(42)(A). 
 37 Id.; see also Gutierrez-Vidal v. Holder, 709 F.3d 728, 732–33 (8th Cir. 2013). 
 38 See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). 
 39 See id.; id. § 1101(a)(42)(A); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13, 1208.16(a)–(b) (2014). 
 40 For example, applicants are eligible for asylum if they demonstrate a well-founded 
fear of persecution, while withholding of removal requires that applicants demonstrate a 
clear probability of persecution. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431–32, 450 
(1987); INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 429–30 (1984). 
 41 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A); Castellano-Chacon v. INS, 341 F.3d 533, 544–45 (6th Cir. 
2003). Several statutory exceptions can preclude a grant of withholding of removal, but 
the ultimate determination is not a matter of discretion. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B). 
 42 Castellano-Chacon, 341 F.3d at 545. 
 43 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b); INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992). 
 44 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment, G.A. Res. 46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/39/51, at 
195 (Dec. 10, 1984). 
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promulgated regulations to implement CAT.45 The regulations 
prohibit the government from returning applicants to their home 
countries if the applicants demonstrate that perpetrators are 
more likely than not to torture them.46 Unlike asylum and 
withholding of removal under the INA, the regulations 
implementing CAT do not require applicants to establish that 
they will be tortured on account of race, religion, or any of the 
other protected grounds.47 
C.  The Credible Fear Interview 
To ensure compliance with the United States’ 
non-refoulement obligations, the expedited removal provisions of 
the INA and immigration regulations prohibit the government 
from summarily deporting a person who demonstrates a credible 
fear of persecution or torture. Specifically, the INA provides that 
an “immigration officer” should not order an alien removed 
“without further hearing or review” when “the alien indicates 
either an intention to apply for asylum . . . or a fear of 
persecution.”48 In many instances, the onus is on the immigration 
officer to ask the questions necessary to discern whether the 
alien may, in fact, have such a fear. Many have criticized this 
aspect of the process, noting that enforcement agents do not 
always ask the questions needed to ascertain whether a fear of 
harm exists, and, in some instances, agents proactively convince 
aliens to agree to removal even after they express a fear of 
harm.49  
If an individual otherwise subject to expedited removal asks 
to apply for asylum or expresses a fear of being persecuted, that 
individual is then transferred to U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (“ICE”)—a component of DHS—which detains the 
alien until the credible fear interview. The law provides that an 
alien must be detained pending the credible fear interview.50 The 
interview is conducted by one of the asylum officers in U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”)—also a 
 
 45 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c), 1208.18 (2014); Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring 
Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, div. G, § 2242(b), 112 Stat. 2681-821, 2681-822 (directing 
the agency to issue regulations to implement CAT).  
 46 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). 
 47 See id.; see also Lopez de Hincapie v. Gonzales, 494 F.3d 213, 220 (1st Cir. 2007). 
 48 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i); see also 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(4) (referring to fears of 
“persecution or torture”).  
 49 See, e.g., U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, 1 REPORT ON ASYLUM 
SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 50–51 (2005) 
[hereinafter 1 USCIRF 2005 REPORT] (observing instances in Houston where agents 
pressured migrants to retract their stated fear).  
 50 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV). 
Do Not Delete 2/15/2015 7:58 PM 
2015] The Causes of the Southwestern Border Surge 345 
component of DHS.51 The officers in USCIS’s Asylum Office must 
assess whether the transferred individual has a “credible fear of 
persecution.”52 The transferred individual demonstrates the 
requisite fear if the asylum officer finds “that there is a 
significant possibility, taking into account the credibility of the 
statements made by the alien in support of the alien’s claim and 
such other facts as are known to the officer, that the alien could 
establish eligibility for asylum.”53 The “significant possibility” 
language was meant to serve as a compromise standard. The 
original House version mandated a “substantial likelihood” that 
the alien could establish asylum eligibility, while the original 
Senate version merely required the asylum officer to determine 
whether the asylum claim was “manifestly unfounded.”54 
Changes to USCIS’s credible fear lesson plan in February 2014, 
however, have led some to question whether the standard will 
become more stringent.55 
The time dedicated to these credible fear interviews 
demonstrates why it could not possibly be a final 
determination—and why the credible fear threshold is 
necessarily low.56 Government officials report that, on average, 
asylum officers interview claimants for about twenty minutes 
before making a credible fear determination.57 The viability of 
many asylum claims takes much longer to tease out. Aside from 
the substantive information asylum officers must discern, twenty 
minutes is hardly enough time to truly assess the credibility of 
the claim itself—a task that is incredibly challenging for 
adjudicators even when there is a full hearing on the merits.58 
Accordingly, as often noted, the credible fear interview is merely 
 
 51 Id. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii), (b)(1)(B). 
 52 Id. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii). 
 53 Id. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(v). 
 54 142 CONG. REC. 25,374 (1996) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch). 
 55 Memorandum from John Lafferty, Asylum Div., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration 
Servs., U.S. Dep ’t of Homeland Sec., to Asylum Office Dirs., et al. (Feb. 28, 2014), 
available at http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Outreach/Notes from Previous 
Engagements/Memorandum-ReleaseofUpdatedADOTCLessonPlan.pdf; see also SARA 
CAMPOS & JOAN FRIEDLAND, AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, MEXICAN AND CENTRAL 
AMERICAN ASYLUM AND CREDIBLE FEAR CLAIMS: BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT 4 (2014). 
 56 But see Asylum Surge Hearing, supra note 5, at 166 (statement of Leslie E. Vélez, 
Senior Protection Officer, U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees) (contending that the 
credible fear threshold is too harsh).  
 57 Id. at 189 (statement of Lori Scialabba, Deputy Director, U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services).  
 58 See generally Scott Rempell, Credibility Assessments and the REAL ID Act’s 
Amendments to Immigration Law, 44 TEX. INT’L L.J. 185, 196 (2008).  
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a screening device, meant to capture all claims that could 
reasonably be viable.59  
D.  Credible Fear Determinations and Detention  
If an asylum officer determines that a claimant does not 
have a credible fear of persecution, the claimant is immediately 
subject to removal.60 Although the claimant is not entitled to a 
full hearing before an immigration judge, he or she can request 
that an immigration judge review the asylum officer’s 
determination that no credible fear of persecution has been 
established; the law requires the immigration judge to review the 
denial within seven days.61 Conversely, if the asylum officer 
determines that the claimant established a credible fear of 
persecution or torture, that individual is placed in formal 
removal proceedings before an immigration judge, where he or 
she will have an opportunity to apply for asylum, statutory 
withholding of removal, and protection under the regulations 
implementing CAT.62  
The immigration courts lack the resources to timely 
adjudicate all the cases on their dockets. There are about 260 
immigration judges spread throughout the immigration courts;63 
they review nearly 300,000 immigration matters annually.64 As a 
result, individuals found to have a credible fear of persecution 
may have to wait years before an immigration judge rules on the 
merits of their claims.65  
The long waiting period makes the issue of detention 
particularly consequential. The law is quite clear that DHS must 
detain apprehended individuals prior to the credible fear 
interview.66 The time lapse between apprehension and the 
credible fear interview, however, is typically only a matter of 
 
 59 See, e.g., Thomas J. White Ctr. on Law & Gov’t, The Expedited Removal 
Study: Report on the First Three Years of Implementation of Expedited Removal, 15 
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 1, 126–27 (2001); Asylum Surge Hearing, supra 
note 5, at 27 (statement of Lori Scialabba, Deputy Director, U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services). 
 60 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(I) (2012). 
 61 Id. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(III); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.30(g) (2014).  
 62 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 235.6(a)(1)(ii). 
 63 Office of the Chief Immigration Judge, U.S. DEPARTMENT JUSTICE, http://www.just 
ice.gov/eoir/ocijinfo.htm (last updated May 2014). 
 64 OFFICE OF PLANNING, ANALYSIS & TECH., EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, 
FY 2013 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, at A2 fig.1 (2014); see also id. at W1 fig.34 (noting 
350,330 pending cases in immigration courts at the end of FY 2013).  
 65 Immigration Court Backlog Tool: Pending Cases and Length of Wait in 
Immigration Courts, TRACIMMIGR., http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court_back 
log/ (last updated June 2014).  
 66 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(4)(ii). 
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days or weeks. If an asylum officer—or an immigration judge if 
the claimant requests further review—finds that the claimant 
has established a credible fear of persecution, immigration law 
prescribes certain circumstances that permit ICE to release the 
individual from custody pending the formal removal proceedings 
in immigration court. The mechanisms for releasing such persons 
are based on whether the individual is classified as an “arriving 
alien.” 
1. Parole for Arriving Aliens 
Parole is an administrative measure ICE can use to 
authorize the temporary release of certain detained aliens. DHS ’s 
parole determinations are not subject to review in immigration 
court.67 Additionally, in the credible fear context, DHS’s parole 
authority is limited to those considered “arriving aliens” because 
they were apprehended at a port of entry.68  
In certain instances, DHS may parole an arriving alien who 
establishes a credible fear of persecution. Immigration 
regulations prescribe that parole may be justified for “urgent 
humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit, provided the 
aliens present neither a security risk nor a risk of absconding.”69 
Within this framework, the regulations provide five categories of 
aliens who may be eligible for parole. These five categories are 
aliens with serious medical conditions, women who are pregnant, 
select juveniles, witnesses in certain proceedings, and aliens 
“whose continued detention is not in the public interest.”70  
In 2009, ICE Assistant Secretary John Morton issued a 
policy directive to provide guidance to ICE’s “Detention and 
Removal Operations (DRO) Field Office personnel for exercising 
their discretion to consider the parole for arriving aliens 
processed under the expedited removal provisions” of the INA 
(“Morton Memo” or “Directive”).71 The Directive sought to clarify 
when an alien can be paroled under the fifth category of the 
regulation—that is, when an alien’s “continued detention is not 
 
 67 See Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, 69 Fed. Reg. 48,877-01, 48,879 
(Aug. 5, 2004) (noting immigration judges’ limited “review of custody determinations”).  
 68 See U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
ICE POLICY DIRECTIVE NO. 11002.1: PAROLE OF ARRIVING ALIENS FOUND TO HAVE A 
CREDIBLE FEAR OF PERSECUTION OR TORTURE ¶¶ 1–5 (2009) [hereinafter MORTON MEMO].  
 69 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b) (internal quotation omitted); see also id. § 235.3(c) (authorizing 
parole for aliens placed in removal proceedings after a positive credible fear finding in 
accordance with the decisional framework of section 212.5(b)). But see 8 C.F.R. 
§ 235.3(b)(4)(ii) (limiting parole eligibility to medical necessity and furthering a 
“legitimate law enforcement objective”).  
 70 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b)(1)–(5).  
 71 MORTON MEMO, supra note 68, ¶ 1. 
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in the public interest.”72 Regarding this fifth category, the 
Directive provides that aliens “should be” paroled if “the alien’s 
identity is sufficiently established, the alien poses neither a flight 
risk nor a danger to the community, and no additional factors 
weigh against release of the alien.”73 By interpreting its parole 
authority broadly, the Morton Memo expanded the circumstances 
under which parole is available to arriving aliens who establish a 
credible fear of persecution or torture.74 
2. Release for Aliens Not Apprehended at a Port of Entry  
If authorities apprehend an alien in the interior of the 
United States but the alien establishes a credible fear of 
persecution, DHS is authorized to release the individual during 
the pendency of the removal proceeding.75 DHS may, however, 
choose to detain the alien or premise release on a bond. Unlike 
detention decisions for arriving aliens, DHS’s detention 
determinations for aliens who are not considered “arriving” are 
subject to review by an immigration judge.76  
E.  Credible Fear Statistics  
Table 1 provides data for credible fear claims adjudicated by 
USCIS’s Asylum Office from FY 1997 through FY 2013:  
 
 72 Id. ¶ 4.3. 
 73 Id. ¶ 8.3.  
 74 Cf. U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
ICE POLICY DIRECTIVE NO. 7-1.0: PAROLE OF ARRIVING ALIENS FOUND TO HAVE A 
CREDIBLE FEAR OF PERSECUTION OR TORTURE ¶ 6 (2007). 
 75 X-K-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 731, 731 (B.I.A. 2005); see also D-J-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 572, 
575−76 (A.G. 2003).  
 76 See X-K-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 731–36; see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h)(2)(i) (2014) 
(providing exceptions to immigration judges’ authority to review custody determinations).  
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Table 1: Percentage of Claims Where USCIS Finds a 
Credible Fear77  
 
Credible 
Fear 
(“CF”) 
Cases 
Referrals 
from ICE 
or CBP 
Total 
Completed 
Cases 
Completed 
Cases: CF 
Found 
Completed 
Cases: CF 
Not Found 
Completed 
Cases: 
Closed 
% of All 
Referred 
Cases 
Where CF 
Found 
FY 97 1438 1206 922 256 28 76.45% 
FY 98 3427 3304 2747 125 432 83.14% 
FY 99 6690 6463 5762 144 557 89.14% 
FY 00 10,315 9971 9285 150 536 93.12% 
FY 01 13,140 13,689 12,932 119 638 94.47% 
FY 02 10,042 9961 9179 84 698 92.15% 
FY 03 6447 6357 5715 45 597 89.90% 
FY 04 7917 7754 7282 32 440 93.91% 
FY 05 9465 9581 8469 144 968 88.39% 
FY 06 5338 5241 3320 584 1337 63.35% 
FY 07 5252 5286 3182 1062 1042 60.20% 
FY 08 4995 4828 3097 816 915 64.15% 
FY 09 5368 5222 3411 1004 807 65.32% 
FY 10 8959 8777 6293 1404 1080 71.70% 
FY 11 11,217 11,529 9423 1054 1052 81.73% 
FY 12 13,880 13,579 10,838 1187 1554 79.81% 
FY 13 36,035 36,174 30,393 2587 3194 84.02% 
 
The figures show that between FY 1997 and FY 2012, the 
number of individuals claiming to fear persecution or torture 
fluctuated from 1438 to 13,880. In FY 2013, by contrast, 
claimants spiked significantly; more than 36,000 expressed (or 
were found to harbor) a fear of persecution or torture.78 The data 
available for FY 2014 indicates a comparably high number. 
Through the first six months of FY 2014, DHS referred more 
than 20,000 claimants to the Asylum Office for credible fear 
interviews.79  
 
 77 This Article obtained the data for Table 1 from Asylum Surge Hearing, supra note 
5, at 227. 
 78 This figure does not include individuals who may have claimed to fear persecution 
or torture but were not provided an interview by the initial immigration officer. See 
HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, HOW TO PROTECT REFUGEES AND PREVENT ABUSE AT THE BORDER 
11–12, 30–31 (2014) [hereinafter HRF, HOW TO PROTECT REFUGEES]. 
 79 USCIS 2014 CREDIBLE FEAR STATISTICS, supra note 9.  
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Aside from the number of claims themselves, the figures also 
indicate the percentage of credible fear interviews that led 
asylum officers to find a credible fear of persecution or torture. 
The data can roughly be broken into three distinct time periods. 
From FY 1998 through FY 2005, between 83% and 94% of 
claimants received favorable credible fear determinations. A 
noticeable drop occurred in FY 2006, where the percentage 
dipped to the sixties and stayed in that range for several years. 
FY 2010 marked the transition into the third time period; since 
that time, the Asylum Office determined that claimants had a 
credible fear in 79%–84% of cases. The preliminary data for the 
first half of FY 2014 indicates an 80% grant rate by the Asylum 
Office.80  
The percentage of individuals found to have a credible fear of 
persecution is even higher when looking solely at those cases 
adjudicated on the merits. After claiming a credible fear of 
persecution, some individuals withdraw their requests for 
asylum before an asylum officer has an opportunity to adjudicate 
their claims. In FY 2013, for example, while USCIS found that 
84% of individuals claiming to fear persecution or torture did 
meet the credible fear standard, asylum officers found the 
credible fear standard was met in 92% of cases assessed on the 
merits.81 When excluding administratively closed cases in the 
first half of FY 2014, the grant rate jumps from 80% to 87%.82 
The percentage of individuals subject to expedited removal 
who claim to fear persecution or torture has also increased. 
According to DHS, from FY 2000 through FY 2009, between 4% 
and 6% of individuals subject to expedited removal expressed a 
fear of persecution or torture if returned to their home country.83 
By FY 2013, that figure rose to 15%.84 
II. UNACCOMPANIED MINORS  
A.  The Law Regarding UACs 
Prior to 2003, immigration officials made little distinction 
between minors and adults when apprehending and detaining 
those who entered the country without authorization.85 While 
 
 80 Id. (indicating a credible fear of persecution was established in 16,467 of the 
20,488 decisions made). 
 81 Asylum Surge Hearing, supra note 5, at 20.  
 82 USCIS 2014 CREDIBLE FEAR STATISTICS, supra note 9.  
 83 Asylum Surge Hearing, supra note 5, at 35. 
 84 Id. 
 85 See generally 6 U.S.C. § 279(g)(2) (2012) (defining an “unaccompanied alien 
child”).  
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UACs are still placed into removal proceedings, the Homeland 
Security Act of 2002 transferred the shelter and placement of 
unaccompanied minors to the Office of Refugee Resettlement 
(“ORR”), which is a component of DHS.86 Further protections for 
unaccompanied minors were created in 2008 when Congress 
passed the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection 
Reauthorization Act (“TVPRA”).87 Absent “exceptional 
circumstances,” the TVPRA requires agencies holding UACs in 
custody to transfer them to ORR within seventy-two hours.88 For 
contiguous countries, DHS must determine, within forty-eight 
hours, whether the minor is a victim of human trafficking or 
otherwise establishes a credible fear of persecution.89 For 
non-contiguous countries—such as those of the Northern 
Triangle—TVPRA requires several agencies to coordinate best 
practices for repatriation.90  
TVPRA also altered determinations regarding 
unaccompanied minors’ custody and eligibility for relief from 
removal. Regarding custody, TVPRA provides that “an 
unaccompanied alien child in the custody of the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services shall be promptly placed in the least 
restrictive setting that is in the best interest of the child.”91 As a 
result, while UACs’ immigration proceedings are pending, federal 
agencies typically try to place them with a relative or other 
sponsor.92 According to the Migration Policy Institute, “[n]inety 
percent of these children are released by ORR into the care of a 
parent, relative, or family friend while they await adjudication of 
their immigration cases, with foster care the placement for the 
remainder.”93 For relief from removal, TVRPA provides 
additional opportunities, such as Special Immigrant Juvenile 
Status for minors who have been abused, abandoned, or 
neglected.94 Like all unauthorized immigrants, unaccompanied 
 
 86 Id. § 279(b)(1); Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 462, 116 
Stat. 2135, 2202–03.  
 87 William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, 
Pub. L. No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044. 
 88 8 U.S.C. § 1232(b)(3) (2012). 
 89 Id. § 1232(a)(4).  
 90 Id. § 1232(a)(1), (c)(5)–(6).  
 91 Id. § 1232(c)(2).  
 92 See id. (noting the law’s preference for “a suitable family member . . . to provide 
care”). 
 93 Muzaffar Chishti & Faye Hipsman, Dramatic Surge in the Arrival of 
Unaccompanied Children Has Deep Roots and No Simple Solutions, MIGRATION POL’Y 
INST. (June 13, 2014), http://migrationpolicy.org/article/dramatic-surge-arrival-unaccom 
panied-children-has-deep-roots-and-no-simple-solutions. 
 94 8 U.S.C. § 1232(d); see id. § 1101(a)(27)(J) (explaining the requirements of Special 
Immigrant Juvenile Status); see also id. § 1101(a)(15)(J), (U) (discussing eligibility for 
J and U visas that certain UACs may be able to obtain). 
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minors who meet the relevant criteria may also be eligible for 
asylum.95  
B.  UAC Statistical Information 
The statistics bear out the extent of the surge in UAC border 
crossings. Along the southwestern border in FY 2013, border 
patrol apprehended 31,491 unaccompanied minors.96 In the first 
three quarters of FY 2014, that number spiked to 62,998.97 The 
general surge in border crossings is reflective of the UAC 
apprehension rate for children migrating from the Northern 
Triangle: 
Table 2: UAC Apprehension Rate for Northern 
Triangle Countries98 
 
Country  FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013 FY 2014 
(through 
August 31) 
El Salvador 1221 1190 1394 3314 5990 14,591 
Guatemala 1115 1517 1565 3835 8068 15,733 
Honduras 968 1017 974 2997 6747 17,582 
Total 9026 9170 8721 10,146 20,805 47,906 
 
The repatriation rate for minors from the Northern Triangle 
decreased from 2008 through 2013. Whereas DHS repatriated 
2311 minors from the Northern Triangle in 2008, only 469 
minors were repatriated in 2013.99 
III. POTENTIAL CAUSES OF THE SURGE  
Most of the causes proffered to explain the surge fall into one 
of two categories: country conditions in the Northern Triangle 
and migrants’ perception that changes to immigration law and 
policy favorably impact their chances to remain in the United 
States permanently or temporarily. Part IV will review both of 
these potential causes before discussing whether the prospect of 
immigration reform, border security concerns, and instances of 
 
 95 See generally id. § 1158(a)–(b). 
 96 Southwest Border Unaccompanied Alien Children, supra note 10 (providing 
statistics through June 30, 2014).  
 97 Id.  
 98 For the source of the data in Table 2, see id. 
 99 Chishti & Hipsman, supra note 93; see also Robles, supra note 11 (noting the 
decrease in removals of children).  
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fraud could impact the migratory calculus. The distinct potential 
causes discussed independently in Part III will be assessed 
holistically in Part IV. 
A.  Regional Instability in the Northern Triangle 
Looking at the countries of origin of those migrating to the 
United States during the surges, one finds at the top El Salvador, 
Honduras, and Guatemala. Many politicians, advocacy groups, 
and others have proffered that the regional instability in these 
countries could be a cause of the increased migration flows in the 
past few years. Advocacy groups have argued that “persecution, 
violence and war[] are the drivers of flight” and that many 
reports “have documented the increased violence in Central 
America.”100 Others have argued that the “resulting uptick in 
asylum claims” directly stems from “an increase in violence in 
Mexico and Central America.”101 Representative Lofgren opined 
that the surge could be “a brewing refugee crisis in the Western 
Hemisphere.”102 Comparable sentiments have been expressed 
about UACs.103 
The limited studies that assessed the situation in Central 
America have indeed found a dire situation in many Central 
American countries—particularly El Salvador, Honduras, and 
Guatemala, which comprise the Northern Triangle.104 In 2006, 
there were more than 14,000 murders recorded in Central 
American countries.105 To put that number in perspective, a 
World Bank study noted that Spain—with a population 
comparable to all Central American countries combined—only 
recorded 336 murders.106 The countries of the Northern Triangle 
had some of the highest murder rates. El Salvador led the list in 
2006 with 64.4 murders for every 100,000 members of the 
population.107 
 
 100 Asylum Surge Hearing, supra note 5, at 94. 
 101 Id. at 156; see also Robles, supra note 11 (recounting the administration’s belief 
that it “seems to be quite clear that what is driving this is what’s happening in their home 
countries”). 
 102 Asylum Surge Hearing, supra note 5, at 5.  
 103 See UAC Surge Hearing, supra note 12, at 46 (statement of Mark Seitz, Bishop of 
the Diocese of El Paso, Texas, U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops).  
 104 A Shared Responsibility—Citizen Security and Counter-Narcotics Initiatives in the 
Americas: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the W. Hemisphere, Peace Corps & Global 
Narcotics Affairs of the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 112th Cong. 57 (2011) (statement 
of Cynthia J. Arnson, Director, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Latin 
America Program). 
 105 WORLD BANK, CRIME AND VIOLENCE IN CENTRAL AMERICA: A DEVELOPMENT 
CHALLENGE, at ii (2011) [hereinafter WORLD BANK, DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGE]. 
 106 Id.  
 107 U.N. Office on Drug & Crime, Intentional Homicide Count and Rate per 100,000 
Population, by Country/Territory (2000-2012), UNODC, http://www.unodc.org/documents/ 
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There are many causes of these high murder rates as well as 
the high rates of crime in general. Chief among them are drug 
trafficking and violence associated with gang activity.108 While 
drug trafficking is a central cause of violence in all three 
countries, a larger percentage of the violence in El Salvador can 
be attributed to gangs.109 Many of the gangs in Central America 
have their roots in the United States. The Central American 
armed conflicts of the 1980s caused hundreds of thousands of 
Central Americans to flee to the United States.110 Economic 
marginalization led a small minority of these migrants to join or 
form gangs.111 When some of these individuals were deported 
back to their home countries in the 1990s, they continued their 
criminal activities and recruited others to join.112 As a result, 
gangs in certain Northern Triangle countries “control large 
neighborhoods in the most important cities.”113  
Additional—and intertwined—causes of the rise in violence 
in the Northern Triangle include the availability of arms and 
weak states that are unable to provide a security apparatus and 
judicial process to sufficiently remedy perceived injustice.114 The 
availability of arms is a product of the regional conflicts of the 
1980s, which created a culture of violence.115 Central America is 
“awash in weapons,” with an estimated 4.5 million firearms 
throughout the region in 2007.116 The weakness of the 
governments in the Northern Triangle exacerbates the level of 
 
gsh/data/GSH2013_Homicide_count_and_rate.xlsx (last visited Sept. 2, 2014) [hereinafter 
UNODC, Homicide Stats]. But cf. WORLD BANK, DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGE, supra note 
105, at 1 (noting that the murder rate in El Salvador in 2006 was 58 per 100,000 
inhabitants). 
 108 WORLD BANK, DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGE, supra note 105; see also ANDREW SELEE 
ET AL., WILSON CTR. & MIGRATION POLICY CTR., CRIME AND VIOLENCE IN MEXICO AND 
CENTRAL AMERICA: AN EVOLVING BUT INCOMPLETE US POLICY RESPONSE 1 (2013) (noting 
that organized crime gives cover to “unorganized crime”).  
 109 Joaquín Villalobos, Violence in Central America, in RETHINKING THE “WAR ON 
DRUGS” THROUGH THE US-MEXICO PRISM 69 (Ernesto Zedillo & Haynie Wheeler eds., 
2012); see also SELEE ET AL., supra note 108, at 4 (reviewing evidence that establishes a 
connection between transshipment drug routes and homicides). Others have cautioned 
that ambiguities in data collection and classification make it hard to state definitively the 
percentage of crime that stems from gang activity. WORLD BANK, DEVELOPMENT 
CHALLENGE, supra note 105, at 15–16. 
 110 WORLD BANK, DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGE, supra note 105, at 15.  
 111 Id.  
 112 Id.; see also U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME 
IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 27 (2012) (discussing the origins of Mara 
Salvatrucha in the 1980s). 
 113 Villalobos, supra note 109, at 69. 
 114 WORLD BANK, DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGE, supra note 105, at ii–iii; SELEE ET AL., 
supra note 108, at 1. 
 115 WORLD BANK, DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGE, supra note 105, at iii. 
 116 Id. 
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violence because it permits criminals to act with impunity 
without significant fear of punishment.117  
Quite distinct from the causes of the turmoil in the Northern 
Triangle, however, is the question of whether these 
circumstances are a cause of the recent spike in UAC border 
crossings and claims of persecution and torture among those 
subject to expedited removal. A potentially useful means to gauge 
causation is to assess whether a spike in the homicide rate 
occurred around the time the credible fear claims and UAC 
border crossings began to increase. As noted above, in 2006, El 
Salvador’s homicide rate was 64.4 for every 100,000 residents. 
The murder rate in Guatemala was 45.3, and in Honduras it was 
44.3. In 2010, the murder rate in Guatemala had fallen slightly 
to 41.6 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants. In El Salvador, the 
rate held steady at 64.1, while in Honduras the murder rate 
spiked to nearly 82, making Honduras’s murder rate “the highest 
in the world.”118 In 2012, as the credible fear claims and UAC 
border crossings began to escalate, the murder rates in Honduras 
further climbed to 90.4, while the rate in Guatemala held fairly 
steady at 39.9, and the homicide rate in El Salvador fell 
significantly to 41.2; the reported reduction in the homicide rate 
in El Salvador correlates with an organized gang truce in early 
2012.119 
 
 117 See WORLD BANK, CRIME AND VIOLENCE IN CENTRAL AMERICA 90 (2010) 
[hereinafter WORLD BANK, CRIME AND VIOLENCE] (illustrating stagnant or decreased trust 
in the justice system and police force in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala from 2004 
to 2008); see also Karen Musalo et al., Crimes Without Punishment: Violence Against 
Women in Guatemala, 21 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 161, 163 (2010) (noting the low rate of 
prosecution against murderers when the victims are female). 
 118 Villalobos, supra note 109, at 64 (providing a murder rate that differs slightly 
from UNODC’s data); see also UNODC, Homicide Stats, supra note 107. 
 119 U.N. OFFICE ON DRUG & CRIME, GLOBAL STUDY ON HOMICIDE, at 45–46, 126, U.N. 
Sales No. 14.IV.1 (2013) [hereinafter UNODC, 2013 GLOBAL STUDY], available at http:// 
www.unodc.org/documents/gsh/pdfs/2014_GLOBAL_HOMICIDE_BOOK_web.pdf; COMM. 
ON MIGRATION OF THE U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, MISSION TO CENTRAL 
AMERICA: THE FLIGHT OF UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN TO THE UNITED STATES 3 (2013). 
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Table 3: Homicide Rates in the Northern Triangle (per 
100,000 Inhabitants)120  
 
Annual 
Homicide 
Rates 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Honduras 44.3 50.0 60.8 70.7 81.8 91.4 90.4 
Guatemala 45.3 43.4 46.1 46.5 41.6 38.6 39.9 
El Salvador 64.4 57.1 51.7 70.9 64.1 69.9 41.2 
 
The increased murder rate in Honduras would seem to 
support the conclusion that an escalation in homicides could be 
representative of the general insecurity that provided an impetus 
for the surges. It would not appear that the same can be said for 
El Salvador, which actually has the highest number of people 
subject to expedited removal who claim to fear persecution or 
torture.121 Numbers, however, can be misleading, and there are a 
couple reasons to view the reported murder rate decline with a 
grain of salt. First, decisions to flee are not made in a 
macro-statistical bubble. The murder rates in El Salvador were 
very high in 2011 and prior years, and the decision to flee could 
be based on the confluence of what residents perceived over the 
course of the preceding years. Indeed, in surveys administered in 
2012 and 2013 in El Salvador, nearly half the respondents did 
not believe the gang truce reduced crime.122 Nevertheless, the 
available data demonstrates substantially fewer Salvadorian 
credible fear referrals toward the end of 2010 and throughout 
2011, even though the murder rate had been high for many 
years.123 
Second, and more importantly, the drop in recorded murder 
rates in El Salvador was at best temporary and at worst illusory. 
Officials in El Salvador have reported a rise in the murder rate 
 
 120 The data for this table was obtained from UNODC, Homicide Stats, supra note 
107.  
 121 See, e.g., USCIS 2014 CREDIBLE FEAR STATISTICS, supra note 9. 
 122 See UNODC, 2013 GLOBAL STUDY, supra note 119, at 46 (noting that 2012 and 
2013 surveys indicate that only half the population believed the gang truce reduced 
crime).  
 123 U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
CREDIBLE FEAR WORKLOAD SUMMARY FY 2011 (2011) [hereinafter USCIS 2011 CREDIBLE 
FEAR STATISTICS], available at http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Outreach/ 
Notes%20from%20Previous%20Engagements/2011/CredibleFearandReasonableFearWork
load.pdf (reporting that from October 2010 through 2011, between 100 and 200 
Salvadorians were usually referred per month).  
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since May 2013, which accelerated in 2014.124 In December 2013, 
authorities discovered secret mass graves.125 These graves, along 
with rises in disappearances during the time of the purported 
truce,126 bring into question whether the gang truce significantly 
reduced the murder rate at any point. Based on this data, it 
appears that the murder rates now comport to the recorded 
averages in 2011 and the years immediately preceding. In this 
respect, the murder rate in El Salvador is not trending in a 
manner that is substantially distinct from Honduras and 
Guatemala. Moreover, the reported homicides in Guatemala are 
under-representative of the actual figures.127 
Homicide victims, however, are not spread evenly 
throughout the Northern Triangle countries. More refined data 
compilations on murder rates indicate that certain pockets of the 
Northern Triangle contain a disproportionate rate of murders per 
capita;128 for example, in Choluteca, Honduras, the murder rate 
per 100,000 inhabitants in 2010 was 21.8, while the rate in 
Atlántida, Honduras during the same year was 131.3.129 Studies 
have indeed shown that UACs are more likely to come from 
regions within their countries where the murder rates are 
particularly high.130  
 
 124 See Nelson Renteria, El Salvador Murders Surge as Gang Truce Fades, REUTERS, 
Apr. 4, 2014, available at http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/04/04/uk-elsalvador-crime-
idUKBREA3302S20140404; Michael Lohmuller, El Salvador Murders Fall Slightly for 
2013, but Rising Again, INSIGHT CRIME (Jan. 14, 2014), http://www.insightcrime.org/ 
news-briefs/el-salvador-murders-fall-slightly-in-2013-but-rising-again; Alexandra Alper et 
al., El Salvador Gang Truce Wobbles as Violent Murders Mount, REUTERS, July 5, 2013, 
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/06/us-elsalvador-violence-idUSBRE96 
501D20130706. 
 125 Miriam Wells, El Salvador Mass Graves Put Pressure on Gang Truce, INSIGHT 
CRIME (Dec. 11, 2013), http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/el-salvador-mass-graves-
put-pressure-on-gang-truce.  
 126 BUREAU OF DIPLOMATIC SEC., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, EL SALVADOR 2014 CRIME AND 
SAFETY REPORT 1–2 (2014), available at https://www.osac.gov/pages/ContentReport 
Details.aspx?cid=15771; see Hannah Stone, The Murky Question of Disappearances in El 
Salvador: An El Faro Investigation, INSIGHT CRIME (Jan. 25, 2013), https://www.osac.gov/ 
pages/ContentReportPDF.aspx?cid=15771. 
 127 See BUREAU OF DIPLOMATIC SEC., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, GUATEMALA 2013 CRIME 
AND SAFETY REPORT 1 (2013), available at https://www.osac.gov/pages/ContentReport 
PDF.aspx?cid=13878 (“In the case of homicides, the [police do] not count homicides if the 
victim left the crime scene alive and subsequently died as a result of injuries.”).  
 128 INTERNACIONAL CTR. FOR THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF MIGRANTS, FORCED 
DISPLACEMENT AND PROTECTION NEEDS PRODUCED BY NEW FORMS OF VIOLENCE AND 
CRIMINALITY IN CENTRAL AMERICA 19–20, 22–23, 25–26 (2012), available at 
http://www.nanseninitiative.org/sites/default/files/UNHCR%20Research%20Paper%20Ma
y%202012.pdf.  
 129 Id. at 25. 
 130 See Ana Gonzalez-Barrera et al., DHS: Violence, Poverty, Is Driving Children to 
Flee Central America to U.S., PEW RES. CENTER (July 1, 2014), http://www.pew 
research.org/fact-tank/2014/07/01/dhs-violence-poverty-is-driving-children-to-flee-central-
america-to-u-s/; see also INTERNACIONAL CTR. FOR THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF MIGRANTS, 
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A final potentially relevant issue to assessing the 
significance of murder rates is whether there are any correlations 
between short-term changes in the homicide rate and subsequent 
fluctuations in the rate of claimants. The homicide rate in El 
Salvador officially began to increase in May 2013.131 According to 
reports on the monthly credible fear referral rate of Salvadorians 
in 2013, there were 749 in March, 947 in April, 1000 in May, 
1419 in June, and, in October, the referral rate remained high at 
1552.132 Since the recorded murder rate continued to increase in 
June and the credible fear referral rate spiked in June as well, 
the data does demonstrate a correlation between reported 
homicides and credible fear referrals. Nevertheless, a confluence 
of additional factors might have influenced the numbers; further 
study is needed to ascertain more precisely the significance of the 
month-to-month credible fear referral trends, as well as the 
monthly UAC data.133  
Insecurity is not simply a product of the murder rate. It 
could also be based on overall crime rates and a general belief 
that the state cannot adequately provide protection against 
criminal elements. Tracking the rates of other violent crimes, 
however, is hard to accurately accomplish. The available data for 
violent crimes, such as assault, robbery, and sexual violence, are 
often incomplete, which makes it difficult to track trends over 
multiple years.134 Additionally, countries and specific localities 
may diverge in how they classify such crimes.135 Further 
compounding the difficulties, there is extreme underreporting of 
 
supra note 128, at 15–26; Dara Lind, These Two Maps Show the Violence Driving Central 
American Children to the US, VOX (July 1, 2014), http://www.vox.com/ 
2014/7/1/5861908/child-migrants-are-fleeing-the-most-dangerous-places-on-earth-in-two. 
 131 Lohmuller, supra note 124.  
 132 U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
CREDIBLE FEAR WORKLOAD SUMMARY FY 2013 (2013), available at http://www.uscis.gov/ 
sites/default/files/USCIS/Outreach/Notes%20from%20Previous%20Engagements/2013/Jul
y%202013/FY13-CFandRF-stats2013-06-30.pdf [hereinafter USCIS 2013 CREDIBLE FEAR 
STATISTICS]; U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
CREDIBLE FEAR WORKLOAD SUMMARY FY 2014 (2014), available at http://www.uscis.gov/ 
sites/default/files/USCIS/Outreach/Notes%20from%20Previous%20Engagements/Asy-Cre 
dible-Reasonable-FearFY14-Q1.pdf. As of October 2014, USCIS’s FY 2013 Credible Fear 
Workload Summary does not include monthly data from July 2013 to September 2013. 
 133 For example, the number of credible fear referrals was lower overall in FY 2012, 
but the month-to-month figures for Salvadorians also show a substantial jump from May 
2012 to June 2012. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND 
SEC., CREDIBLE FEAR WORKLOAD SUMMARY FY 2012 (2012), available at 
http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Outreach/Notes%20from%20Previous%20E
ngagements/2012/December%202012/Credible-Reasonable-workloadsFY12.pdf.  
 134 See, e.g., U.N. Office on Drug & Crime, Robbery at the National Level, Number of 
Police-Recorded Offences (2013), http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/ 
statistics/crime/CTS2013_Robbery.xls [hereinafter UNODC, Robbery Statistics] 
(providing no data on the rate of robbery in Honduras from 2003 through 2010).  
 135 See WORLD BANK, CRIME AND VIOLENCE, supra note 117, at 5.  
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these crimes because, among other reasons, perceived police 
ineptitude negates the motivation to seek redress.136 
Consequently—and paradoxically—in some instances, increased 
crime rates could be the result of heightened efforts by the State 
to take the reporting seriously (and perception by citizens that 
reporting will actually lead to a proactive response).137 The data 
that is available does not demonstrate an overall increase or 
decrease in crime rates that could confidently account for the 
impetus to flee and seek refuge in the United States.138  
Aside from the specific incidents of homicide and other 
crimes, another potentially relevant cause of migration could be 
how secure individuals feel in their home countries. The premise 
here is that widespread perceptions of insecurity could fuel 
migration even for those who have not been personally 
victimized. Professors Hiskey, Malone, and Orcés have studied 
the link between migration and perceptions of insecurity in the 
Northern Triangle.139 The results of their surveys demonstrate 
that even as rates of violence increased over the last decade 
within the Northern Triangle, respondents’ perception of 
insecurity actually decreased.140 The one exception was El 
 
 136 Id. at 10 (finding that, in 2008, between 58% and 73% of the victims of a crime in 
El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala did not report the incident); INTERNACIONAL CTR. 
FOR THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF MIGRANTS, supra note 128, at 15 (“[V]ictims interviewed 
during the development of this study state that they do not denounce their cases before 
the corresponding bodies for fear of being publicly identified or of being victimized again 
by [organized crime] . . . .”). 
 137 See UAC Surge Hearing, supra note 12, at 46 (statement of Mark Seitz, Bishop of 
the Diocese of El Paso, Texas, U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops) (“With the increased 
efforts by the Honduran government to stem communications from gang-leaders within 
prisons, there are reports of increased violence as gangs fragment and mid-level criminal 
operators compete for control.”). 
 138 For the limited data that is available, there does not appear to be a noticeable 
increase in assault rates around the time when claims began to spike. In El Salvador, the 
rate of assaults per 100,000 inhabitants was 76.2 in 2005, and 67.1 in 2012. U.N. Office 
on Drug & Crime, Assault at the National Level, Number of Police-Recorded Offences 
(2013), http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/statistics/crime/CTS2013_Assa 
ult.xls. The data available for sexual assaults does depict an escalation in incidents in El 
Salvador and Guatemala (although the data for Guatemala only covers 2011 and 2012). 
U.N. Office on Drug & Crime, Total Sexual Offences Against Children at the National 
Level, Number of Police Recorded Offences (2013), https://www.unodc.org/documents/ 
data-and-analysis/statistics/crime/CTS2013_SexualViolence.xls. For robberies, the rates 
increased until 2009 but subsequently declined. UNODC, Robbery Statistics, supra note 
134. The robbery rates in Guatemala decreased from 2004 to 2009, but there is no data 
available subsequent to 2009. Id. Despite the lack of data UNODC was able to obtain, the 
World Bank noted in a 2010 report that “[a]necdotal accounts suggest that armed robbery 
has become increasingly common in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras.” WORLD 
BANK, CRIME AND VIOLENCE, supra note 117, at 5, 8. If this were the case and the trend 
continued subsequent to the report, it would buttress the significance of country 
conditions as a basis for migrants to flee the Northern Triangle.  
 139 See Jonathan Hiskey et al., Violence and Migration in Central America, 
AMERICASBAROMETER INSIGHTS, 2014, at 1. 
 140 Id. at 2–3. 
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Salvador, where respondents’ fear of crime remained constant.141 
The authors proffer that “Central Americans may have become 
increasingly desensitized to high levels of crime, or made 
behavioral adjustments in their daily lives to avoid victimization, 
and thus are now less likely to feel unsafe in their 
neighborhoods.”142  
Reports appear to corroborate the professors’ desensitization 
suggestion because, in recent years, organized gangs in the 
Northern Triangle “have established themselves as an 
alternative, if not primary, authority in parts of the countries.”143 
A study conducted by the Internacional Centre for the Human 
Rights of Migrants (“ICHRM”) also lends support to the 
professors’ suggestion that citizens in the Northern Triangle are 
not only altering their daily behavior, but rather that the 
organized crime syndicates in the Northern Triangle have caused 
significant internal displacement within the countries.144 The 
ICHRM found that within the Northern Triangle, organized 
criminal enterprises are carving out territory to facilitate their 
illegal trades, leading to hot zones in the countries where 
murder, extortion, kidnapping, trafficking, and other crimes are 
particularly high.145 As organized criminal enterprises 
accumulate more territory, citizens’ options to relocate within the 
state diminish. The problem is particularly prominent in 
Honduras, which  
offers very few options for internal forced displacement, since 
organized crime has appropriated a great quantity of territories in the 
country. Maras or organized gangs are mainly present in the capital 
cities . . . and the country’s commercial capital[,] . . . while drug cartels 
operate in the east of the countries . . . and in some areas of the west 
and northwest . . . .146  
Of course, migrating to the United States might be seen as 
more desirable than internal relocation. The potential benefits 
include family reunification and economic opportunity. 
Unsurprisingly, studies have shown that depressed economic 
opportunities and family reunification are also factors that drive 
migration from the Northern Triangle.147 The economic outlook in 
 
 141 Id. at 3 (comparing responses from 2004 through 2012). 
 142 Id. at 3–4. 
 143 UAC Surge Hearing, supra note 12, at 47 (statement of Mark Seitz, Bishop of the 
Diocese of El Paso, Texas, U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops). 
 144 INTERNACIONAL CTR. FOR THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF MIGRANTS, supra note 128, at 15.  
 145 Id. at 16–26. 
 146 Id. at 24. 
 147 See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Children on the Run, 16–17 (Mar. 12, 2014) 
[hereinafter UNHCR, Children on the Run]. 
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Northern Triangle countries is indeed bleak.148 While much of the 
economic turmoil is intertwined with high crime rates, some of 
the depressed economic conditions that cause individuals to 
migrate are attributable to general market forces. For example, 
Guatemalan migrants have been affected by the “demise in the 
coffee industry in recent years.”149 Additionally, the global 
recession spawned by the U.S. financial crisis in 2008 
significantly impacted the Salvadorian economy because a 
substantial percentage of the economy is dependent on 
remittances from the United States.150  
Surveys on national crime rates and overall perceptions of 
insecurity do not necessarily account for demographic factors 
such as age and gender. Violence in the Northern Triangle 
appears to disproportionately impact younger members of the 
population.151 The relevance of this disproportionate impact to 
UACs is intuitive; for credible fear claimants, migrants as a 
whole tend to be younger than the overall population.152 Young 
migrants have conveyed a growing Hobson’s choice because of 
criminals’ recruitment tactics. Reports indicate that children now 
face the realization that they have to join gangs or risk 
victimization because of gangs’ recruitment tactics, which makes 
the decision to flee their only viable option.153 Over the last five 
years in parts of Honduras, for example, “the number of kids 
coming through the doors who are victims of violence has 
 
 148 See Child Poverty: A Priority Challenge, CHALLENGES (U.N. Int’l Children’s 
Emergency Fund), May 2010, at 1, 7 (noting the extreme rates of child poverty in 
Northern Triangle countries); Stephanie Gosk et al., Desperate Journey: Crime and 
Poverty Drive Honduran Kids to U.S., NBC NEWS (July 7, 2014), http://www.nbc 
news.com/storyline/immigration-border-crisis/desperate-journey-crime-poverty-drive-hond 
uran-kids-u-s-n150011 (reviewing malnourishment and schooling rates among Honduran 
children).  
 149 COMM. ON MIGRATION OF THE U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, supra note 
119, at 2. 
 150 Id.; see Villalobos, supra note 109, at 69.  
 151 See Julie Turkewitz, Fear Is Driving Young Men Across the U.S. Border, ATLANTIC 
(June 20, 2014, 4:07 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/06/cred 
ible-fear-whats-driving-central-americans-across-the-us-border/373158/ (“[G]angs . . . feed 
on the money and manpower that youths provide, and pursue them with an 
almost-religious persistence.”). 
 152 See Alex Arnold et al., Who Seeks to Exit? Security, Connections, and Happiness as 
Predictors of Migration Intentions in the Americas, AMERICASBAROMETER INSIGHTS, 2011, 
at 1, 3 (noting that aging members of the population are less likely to “leave their 
homeland to move to another country”). 
 153 See Turkewitz, supra note 151; Moni Basu, Daniel’s Journey: How Thousands of 
Children Are Creating a Crisis in America, CNN (June 19, 2014, 5:42 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/06/13/us/immigration-undocumented-children-explainer/ (noting 
how “[g]ang members [have] infiltrated public schools” in El Salvador). 
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tripled,” and pediatricians have “had to become . . . expert[s] at 
repairing the damage bullets do to children.”154  
A study published by the United Nations in 2014 found that 
children from Northern Triangle countries have noted security 
concerns as a basis for fleeing with much greater frequency in 
recent years.155 The study is based on interviews the U.N. 
conducted with children who fled Mexico and the Northern 
Triangle around the time of the surge. In a previous 2006 study, 
only 13% of children mentioned “international protection 
concerns” as a basis for migrating.156 “International protection 
concerns” include “violence in society predominantly by armed 
criminal actors, and abuse in the home.”157 In the interviews 
conducted between 2011 and 2013 for the 2014 study, 53% of 
children voiced comparable reasons for migrating.158 The 
numbers were not spread evenly between the three Northern 
Triangle countries. Twenty percent of children from Guatemala 
mentioned violence as a basis for fleeing, while 43% from 
Honduras made similar claims and a staggering 69% of children 
from El Salvador indicated that violence formed a basis for 
fleeing.159 A plurality of those interviewed stated that they had 
already experienced actual harm or the threat of harm from 
gangs or other criminals.160 Boys were more likely to report 
violence generally while girls were more likely to report actual or 
threatened sexual violence.161 While the study documents rising 
security concerns, it also makes clear that family reunification 
and greater opportunities drive many children to migrate to the 
United States.162  
As a final point, regardless of whether depressed economic 
conditions, deteriorating security concerns, or domestic violence 
is responsible, the rate of asylum requests by individuals from 
Northern Triangle countries is also worth mentioning. The U.N. 
has calculated that since 2009, “Mexico, Panama, Nicaragua, 
Costa Rica and Belize documented a 435% increase in the 
 
 154 Gosk et al., supra note 148; see Robles, supra note 11 (noting that the majority of 
children live in gang-controlled areas); see also James Bargent, Honduras Extortion 
Gangs Undergoing Violent Leadership Crisis, INSIGHT CRIME (June 3, 2014), 
http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/honduras-extortion-gangs-undergoing-violent-lea 
dership-crisis (noting that attempts to crack down on gang leaders in prison has led to the 
splintering of the organizational structure and increased violence). 
 155 UNHCR, Children on the Run, supra note 147, at 24. 
 156 Id. 
 157 Id. 
 158 Id. 
 159 Id. at 25. 
 160 Id. at 26. 
 161 Id. at 27. 
 162 Id. at 7–10. 
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number of asylum applications lodged by individuals from El 
Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala.”163 
On the whole, the numbers indisputably demonstrate a dire 
situation in the Northern Triangle. Crime rates are high, gangs 
and other criminal entities run rampant, economic opportunities 
are limited, and the governments have largely shown themselves 
incapable of curtailing the violence. Much of the data indicates 
that the conditions in the Northern Triangle have been grim for 
many years, while other data suggests that certain 
circumstances have worsened since the surge commenced.  
B.  Word of Mouth 
A recurring basis asserted to explain the surges has been 
what can be referred to as the word of mouth effect. Individuals 
learn about actual or allegedly successful ways to enter the 
United States and mimic the pattern that has been successful. 
Recent reports concerning the migrant community from the 
frontlines of the southwestern border have provided firsthand 
accounts of how the word of mouth effect is fueling migration 
from the Northern Triangle.164 One article reported that 
“[m]igrants have sent word back home they received a ‘permit’ to 
remain at least temporarily in the United States, feeding rumors 
along migrant routes and spurring others to embark on the long 
journey.”165 Providing anecdotal support, a migrant explained, “I 
heard in Guatemala that people were caught by immigration, but 
then they let them go and gave them a permit.”166 Representative 
Henry Cuellar, a Democrat who represents a Texas district that 
borders Mexico, explained that there is a “perception” among 
migrants “that if you step on American soil, they will give you a 
piece of paper, you go to the bus station and you can go anywhere 
in the United States. You’re free with that permiso.”167 This 
 
 163 Id. at 4. 
 164 See, e.g., Illegal Immigrant: Reports in Central America Encourage Trek North, 
KRGV.COM (June 3, 2014), http://www.krgv.com/news/illegal-immigrant-reports-in-cent 
ral-america-encourage-trek-north/ (“[T]he message being disseminated in [Guatemala] is, 
‘go to America with your child, you won’t be turned away.’”).  
 165 Julia Preston, Migrants Flow in South Texas, as Do Rumors, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 
2014, at A1. 
 166 Id.; see also Basu, supra note 153 (“[UACs] make no quarrels about getting 
caught.”). 
 167 Preston, supra note 165; see also Lisa Riordan Seville & Hannah Rappleye, Border 
Children Tell Their Stories: Why We Came to the US, NBC NEWS (June 12, 2014), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/investigations/border-children-tell-their-stories-why-we-ca 
me-us-n129646 (noting rumors of “lax enforcement”); Kirk Semple, Surge in Child 
Migrants Reaches New York, Overwhelming Advocates, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2014, at A19 
(listing a cause of minors fleeing their home countries as “a perceived change in American 
policy that would favor child immigrants”). 
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perception can be seen by the fact that more and more migrants 
have stopped trying to evade Border Patrol agents; rather, they 
“run toward agents.”168 
The question, then, is what is fueling the word of mouth 
effect that has led people to believe that their chance to remain 
in the United States has significantly increased. The suggested 
potential factors diverge between credible fear claimants and 
UACs.  
1. Credible Fear Claims  
In the context of the rise in credible fear claims, some of the 
most commonly cited reasons for the word of mouth effect are 
credible fear grant rates, U.S. detention policies, misinformation 
about the benefits of a favorable credible fear determination, and 
asylum grant rates. Each will be reviewed in turn.  
a. Credible Fear Grant Rates 
As noted above, some have asserted that a possible cause of 
the increase in individuals claiming to fear persecution or torture 
could be the high rate at which the Asylum Office is finding that 
individuals have established a credible fear of persecution or 
torture; a positive finding would make it less likely the 
government would summarily deport a migrant who is otherwise 
subject to expedited removal.169 Proponents of this argument 
point to the fact that positive credible fear determinations have 
been fairly high in recent years, averaging between 80% and 
85%—and even around 90% when excluding cases not assessed 
on the merits.170 Historically, however, there have been many 
years where the credible fear grant rates met or exceeded those 
accompanying the current surge in claims, but a comparably high 
request rate did not materialize. For example, the credible fear 
grant rate hovered around 90% from 1999 to 2005, but the 
number of referrals to the Asylum Office never increased by more 
than a few thousand in any given year.171 
 
 168 Preston, supra note 165. 
 169 Asylum Surge Hearing, supra note 5, at 2 (statement of Rep. Bob Goodlatte, 
Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary) (attributing, in part, the credible fear surge to the 
“virtual rubberstamping of applications”).  
 170 The grant rates reported by ICE may also not be entirely accurate or 
representative. Advocacy groups have reported instances where U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection (“CBP”) did not refer to the Asylum Office individuals who asserted a fear of 
persecution. See, e.g., Asylum Surge Hearing, supra note 5, at 141 (statement of American 
Immigration Lawyers Association); HRF, HOW TO PROTECT REFUGEES, supra note 78, at 
11–12, 30–31. Conversely, others have stated that the high grant rate could be the result 
of better screenings by CBP.  
 171 Asylum Surge Hearing, supra note 5, at 227.  
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Aside from the grant rate itself, another proffered cause for 
the surge in claims is the belief that officials have lowered the 
standard needed to establish a credible fear of persecution.172 The 
assertion that the Asylum Office incorrectly applies the credible 
fear standard, however, is both overly simplistic and irrelevant. 
The converse argument could also have been made when the 
grant rate was low because, for many credible fear assessments, 
the decisions are not based on clear-cut standards that assessors 
can apply rigidly. Asylum evaluations entail matters of degree, 
probability assessments, and reasonable disagreements about the 
merits of claims—in addition to credibility determinations that 
are difficult to render in a short timeframe. As a result, the 
credible fear “significant possibility” language often imparts onto 
decision makers the need to assess the probability of a 
probability.173 For the nexus prong of asylum determinations, the 
scope of conduct that falls within one of the protected grounds is 
continuously evolving, and courts even disagree sometimes about 
the scope of certain protected grounds.174 Thus, distinctions in 
grant rates are more likely a product of two possibilities: how 
much adjudicators choose to err on the side of caution and 
whether the circumstances in applicants’ home countries altered 
the viability of the proffered bases for asylum claims.  
More relevant than the particular assessment threshold is 
whether there has been a noticeable shift in the overall grant 
rate. In a vacuum, the high grant rate in recent years is not itself 
a significant contributing cause of the surge in claims, but the 
distinction between the grant rate during the surge and the rate 
before the surge could play a larger role. From 2006 to 2009, the 
percentage of claims where the Asylum Office found a credible 
fear was in the sixties.175 Subsequently, the grant rate quickly 
accelerated to the seventies and eighties as the number of 
credible fear claims began to rise.176 Thus, the current high grant 
rates come on the coattails of a period in time in which the grant 
rates were historically low. It could be argued that it is not so 
much that the current grant rate is historically anomalous, but 
 
 172 Id. at 6 (statement of Rep. Jason Chaffetz) (attributing the grant rate to “the 
Obama administration’s undermining of the enforcement of our immigration law”). 
 173 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(v) (2012) (providing the credible fear assessment 
standard); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431–32 (1987) (discussing the likelihood 
of harm that applicants must demonstrate to establish a well-founded fear of 
persecution); id. at 450 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 174 Compare Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615–16 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that the 
Board’s particular social group construction is not entitled to deference), with 
Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081, 1087–88 (9th Cir. 2013) (disagreeing with 
aspects of the analysis in Gatimi). 
 175 Asylum Surge Hearing, supra note 5, at 227.  
 176 Id. 
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rather that it jumped significantly in a short period of time—and 
the migrating public might have taken notice of the grant rate 
spike. Indeed, the rise in grant rates might have been 
particularly significant for individuals from the Northern 
Triangle, as their grant rates in the mid-2000s were particularly 
low. For example, according to the Congressional Research 
Service, in FY 2008, the Asylum Office only found that 40% of 
Salvadorians had a credible fear of persecution or torture—a rate 
that has since gone up.177 Noting this potential cause does not 
necessarily impugn to migrators any nefarious intention. A 
prospective migrant who learns that grants rates have increased 
may reasonably factor this information into his or her decision to 
flee a country with security woes and depressed economic 
opportunities.  
b. The Morton Memo and Detention Rates  
The Morton Memo has been cited as a potential cause of the 
surge in credible fear claims because ICE issued it in December 
2009, which is around the time when individuals subject to 
expedited removal began to assert a fear of persecution or torture 
with greater frequency.178 The argument is that claimants are 
more likely to assert a fear of persecution because the Morton 
Memo expanded the criteria for parole eligibility. The data does 
appear to show a rise in the percentage of eligible applicants that 
ICE releases under its parole authority.179 ICE provided Human 
Rights First with statistical data that indicates that the rate of 
release on parole between FY 2004 and FY 2007 dropped from 
41.3% to 4.2%.180 By FY 2012, the rate of release rose to 80%.181  
Despite the increased release rate based on parole, the 
Morton Memo’s limited scope minimizes the potential impact of 
its change to detention practices. All migrants subject to 
expedited removal can claim to fear persecution or torture, but 
only “arriving aliens”—those apprehended at a port of entry—are 
 
 177 Id. at 70 (statement of Ruth Ellen Wasem, Congressional Research Service). 
 178 Id. at 2 (statement of Rep. Bob Goodlatte). 
 179 See infra Table 4 for a compilation of the available parole data. Even if parole is 
granted, release from detention may still require the detainee to post bond. See Asylum 
Surge Hearing, supra note 5, at 105–06 (statement of U.S. Commission on International 
Religious Freedom). 
 180 HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, U.S. DETENTION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS 35 (2009) [hereinafter 
HRF, ASYLUM DETENTION]; see also U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., U.S. DEP’T 
OF HOMELAND SEC., REPORT TO CONGRESS: DETAINED ASYLUM SEEKERS FISCAL YEAR 
2007, at 6 (2008) [hereinafter ICE 2007 DETENTION STATISTICS] (noting that in FY 2007 
“67 percent of all aliens found to have met the ‘credible fear’ screening standard who were 
detained had 90 or fewer days in detention”). 
 181 Asylum Surge Hearing, supra note 5, at 107 (statement of U.S. Commission on 
International Religious Freedom) (recounting information that ICE provided to USCIRF).  
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potentially eligible for parole.182 Most individuals subject to 
expedited removal, however, are not considered arriving aliens. 
The available data indicates that approximately 75% of 
individuals claiming to fear persecution or torture are not 
apprehended at a port of entry.183 In the first half of FY 2014, for 
example, 16,428 of the 20,488 credible fear decisions concerned 
individuals apprehended inland.184 Consequently, the detention 
policies described in the Morton Memo only apply to 
approximately 25% of individuals subject to expedited removal 
who claim to fear persecution or torture. Thus, while there does 
appear to be a substantial increase in the number of individuals 
released on parole, the relatively low number of claimants to 
whom ICE’s parole authority applies cautions against finding 
that the Morton Memo’s detention policy changes are itself 
significantly responsible for the increase in credible fear claims. 
To more accurately assess the true impact of the Morton Memo, 
DHS would need to provide data on the number of Northern 
Triangle migrants who qualify as arriving aliens.  
Regarding ICE’s detention practices more generally, a few 
cautionary words are in order. The data available for measuring 
detention rates are far from comprehensive. The information that 
is available is often the product of formal or informal requests 
made to DHS by advocacy groups for statistical data that cover 
delineated time periods—or statistical data provided to the U.S. 
Commission on International Religious Freedom (“USCIRF”), an 
independent government agency tasked with assessing DHS’s 
detention practices as they pertain to the expedited removal 
process.185 Thus, the obtained data does not cover many years 
since DHS (and the former INS) began compiling statistics on 
expedited removal and credible fear cases. Moreover, even for the 
years when DHS publicized its detention data, the information 
does not always appear to consistently quantify the detention 
status of asylum seekers subject to expedited removal. DHS has 
noted that the “proportions in various outcomes classes are not 
strictly comparable” to the data compiled in previous years.186 
 
 182 See MORTON MEMO, supra note 68, ¶¶ 1–4.  
 183 See, e.g., USCIS 2014 CREDIBLE FEAR STATISTICS, supra note 9; USCIS 2013 
CREDIBLE FEAR STATISTICS, supra note 132. 
 184 USCIS 2014 CREDIBLE FEAR STATISTICS, supra note 9. 
 185 USCIRF was established by the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998. See 
1 USCIRF 2005 REPORT, supra note 49, at 10.  
 186 U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
DETAINED ASYLUM SEEKERS: FISCAL YEARS 2009 AND 2010 REPORT TO CONGRESS 3 (2012) 
[hereinafter ICE 2009 & 2010 DETENTION STATISTICS]; Asylum Fraud: Abusing America’s 
Compassion?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration & Border Sec. of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 116 (2014) [hereinafter Asylum Fraud Hearing] 
(providing a copy of ICE’s FY 2012 report on detained asylum seekers). 
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Additionally, the methodology DHS uses to classify detention 
status has changed over the years.187 Also worth noting, because 
detention data takes into account the initial detention decision 
and the ultimate release rates for applicants who might have 
been detained initially, the detention and custody counts differ 
from the number of credible fear decisions made in a particular 
fiscal year. Given the shortcomings in the data, this Article can 
only use the information obtained to illustrate general detention 
trends and to assess the proportional use of certain detention and 
release methods. 
Table 4 provides a summary of the available data. The first 
two columns provide the number of credible fear claimants who 
were and were not detained. For those who were detained, the 
remainder of Table 4 lists the reasons why ICE eventually 
released them.  
Table 4: Detention and Release Rate Data for Credible 
Fear Claimants188 
 
 NOT DET DET REASN FOR RLEASE 
   BOND DEP DETN OR OS OTHR PARO USM TR VD WD XFER 
FY 2006 4461 257 41 143 28 2 4 N/A 16 0 13 3 0 7 
FY 2007 605 4614 1502 2031 81 355 68 N/A 207 5 277 23 22 43 
FY 2009 5386 5317 1972 1441 487 403 164 254 284 15 N/A 10 28 259 
FY 2010 9291 9041 4272 1721 648 415 200 163 1095 31 N/A 13 6 475 
FY 2012 816 14,525 ≈4969 ≈2393 ≈881 ≈3841 ≈242 ≈175 1175 25 N/A 26 1 ≈793 
*NOT DET=not detained; DET=detained; REASN FOR 
RLEASE=reason why ICE released a detained migrant; 
BOND=released on Bond; DEP=released for removal from the United 
States; DETN=detained; OR=released on recognizance; OS=released 
 
 187 Compare U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, 2 REPORT ON ASYLUM 
SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL: EXPERT REPORTS 333 (2005) [hereinafter 2 USCIRF  
2005 REPORT] (defining the categories that comprise “release” and “held” determinations), 
with ICE 2009 & 2010 DETENTION STATISTICS, supra note 186, at 46 (defining the terms 
used in 2009).  
 188 For the data used to compile Table 4, see Asylum Fraud Hearing, supra note 186, 
at 117, 138 (providing the credible fear statistics in ICE’s FY 2012 report on detained 
asylum seekers); ICE 2009 & 2010 DETENTION STATISTICS, supra note 186, at 4, 46; ICE 
2007 DETENTION STATISTICS, supra note 180, at 4 (providing summary data only); U.S. 
IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., REPORT TO 
CONGRESS: DETAINED ASYLUM SEEKERS FISCAL YEAR 2006, at 4 (2007) [hereinafter ICE 
2006 DETENTION STATISTICS]. Some of the figures for FY 2012 are estimations because the 
PDF version of the report in the congressional record blurs some of the release rate 
numbers. See Asylum Fraud Hearing, supra note 186, at 138. The definitions of the 
reasons for release come from the reports. Because ICE modified its release categories, 
Table 4 includes the notation “N/A” when a certain category is not applicable in a given 
fiscal year. 
Do Not Delete 2/15/2015 7:58 PM 
2015] The Causes of the Southwestern Border Surge 369 
on an order of supervision; OTHR=includes escaped, lack of funds to 
detain, lack of space, and all cases deemed unclassified for release 
details; PARO=paroled into the United States; TR=released, case 
terminated; USM=released to U.S. Marshals; VD=released for 
voluntary departure from the United States; WD=released, alien 
withdraws application; XFER=transferred between facilities; 
N/A=category not applicable within that fiscal year. 
The available data does not establish a definitive trend for 
general detention rates. To the contrary, it appears quite 
haphazard. As Table 4 illustrates, ICE detained very few 
claimants in FY 2006. By contrast, ICE initially detained nearly 
all credible fear claimants in FY 2007. In FYs 2009 and 2010, 
however, ICE only detained approximately 50% of claimants. 
Changing course once again in FY 2012, ICE initially detained 
almost all credible fear claimants. The basis for the fluctuation in 
initial detention determinations is unclear. It could be the result 
of policy changes or inconsistent methodologies employed by ICE 
to code the data.189 Moreover, ICE does not provide any 
additional data on the release of those who were not detained, 
which would help to obtain a more accurate understanding of its 
detention practices.  
Perhaps more germane than the general detention rates are 
the release rates and the average length of detention. In 2001, 
the government released prior to their hearing date in 
immigration court 86.1% of claimants found to have a credible 
fear of persecution or torture.190 By 2003, the release rate had 
fallen to 62.5%.191 In FY 2006, ICE released nearly all claimants 
within ninety days.192 While not publically available, groups that 
have seen the release rates for FY 2007 estimate that it dropped 
to 44.7%, which would coincide with ICE’s incredibly low use of 
its parole authority in FY 2007.193 In FYs 2009, 2010, and 2012, 
ICE again released almost all detainees, and the vast majority 
were released within ninety days.194 Thus, the data shows that 
generally low release rates in FY 2007 increased thereafter and 
remained consistently high through FY 2012. The data also 
 
 189 For instance, since authorities must detain migrants subject to expedited removal 
prior to a credible fear determination by the Asylum Office, it is possible that ICE has 
modified how it accounts for detention during this time period. See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV) (2012). 
 190 2 USCIRF 2005 REPORT, supra note 187.  
 191 Id. 
 192 ICE 2006 DETENTION STATISTICS, supra note 188, at 6. 
 193 HRF, ASYLUM DETENTION, supra note 180, at 35. 
 194 Asylum Fraud Hearing, supra note 186, at 136; ICE 2009 & 2010 DETENTION 
STATISTICS, supra note 186, at 44. 
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generally shows that most claimants were not detained for very 
long. 
In sum, based on the available data, it appears that release 
rates have significantly increased for arriving aliens. More 
generally, it also appears that release rates have increased since 
FY 2007, but given the lenient detention practices in FY 2006, 
the current detention practices are not unprecedented. 
c. The Implications of Credible Fear Grants 
As reviewed above, the credible fear screening standard is 
much lower than the ultimate standard adjudicators use to 
determine if an applicant is entitled to asylum. Nevertheless, 
media reports and political organizations have incorrectly stated 
that credible fear grants constitute “temporary asylum” or 
otherwise imply that a credible fear grant provides an 
opportunity to obtain benefits greater than what it actually 
provides.195 Advocacy groups have noted, however, that “[t]his 
kind of misinformation can then be circulated through social 
media and word of mouth, potentially encouraging people to 
make decisions based on inaccurate information.”196 Accordingly, 
reports on the perceived benefits of credible fear grants might 
contribute to the word of mouth effect in this context. 
d. Asylum Grant Rates 
A final potential contributor to the word of mouth effect 
concerns asylum grant rates and whether an increased likelihood 
of success could incentivize individuals from the Northern 
Triangle to migrate to the United States and express a fear of 
persecution. Table 5 provides the grant and denial rates in 
immigration court for Northern Triangle asylum seekers. There 
are, however, numerous additional categories not provided here, 
such as the number of applicants who abandon their claims. 
 
 195 See, e.g., Immigration: Claims for Asylum Soar in 2013, UNITED PRESS INT’L (Dec. 
13, 2013), http://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2013/12/13/Immigration-Claims-for-asylum-
soar-in-2013/UPI-12891386944160/; Brian Bennett, Immigration Claims for Asylum Soar, 
L.A. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/dec/12/news/la-pn-immi 
gration-asylum-claims-soar-20131212. 
 196 HRF, HOW TO PROTECT REFUGEES, supra note 78, at 17. 
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Table 5: Asylum Grant Rate for Northern Triangle 
Countries197  
 
 El Salvador Guatemala Honduras 
Year Granted Denied Granted Denied Granted Denied 
FY 2009 100 1049 123 1034 34 347 
FY 2010 123 923 131 894 56 321 
FY 2011 137 1141 145 851 58 421 
FY 2012 158 971 192 823 77 388 
FY 2013 181 1186 153 829 92 575 
 
For all three countries, the data establishes that the grant 
rates are exceptionally low. Additionally, the figures show little 
to no escalation in the grant rate immediately preceding or 
during the surge. Accordingly, it does not appear that asylum 
grant rates have contributed to the surge.  
2. UAC Border Crossings  
For UACs, many suggest that the word of mouth effect is the 
product of several recent legislative and policy changes to 
immigration law and enforcement, as well as accompanying 
attempts by criminal organizations to exploit real and perceived 
changes to the law.198 TVPRA and the Deferred Action for 
Childhood Arrivals are the two changes considered most 
responsible for spreading word that deportation is less likely to 
occur or not likely to happen at all.  
a. Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act 
As noted above, TVPRA provides that “an unaccompanied 
alien child in the custody of the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services shall be promptly placed in the least restrictive setting 
that is in the best interest of the child.”199 For children from 
noncontiguous countries such as those of the Northern Triangle, 
TVPRA—for quite legitimate reasons—diminishes the 
 
 197 To view the source from which Table 5’s data is derived, see OFFICE OF PLANNING, 
ANALYSIS & TECH., EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
IMMIGRATION COURTS ASYLUM STATISTICS FY 2009–2013 (2014), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/efoia/FY2009-FY2013AsylumStatisticsbyNationality.pdf. 
 198 See, e.g., Chishti & Hipsman, supra note 93; Carle Hulse, Migrant Surge Traced to 
Law on Trafficking, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2014, at A1. 
 199 8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(2)(A) (2012).  
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government’s ability to quickly deport minors. The premise of 
these repatriation hurdles is to protect victims of human 
trafficking.200 The surge in UAC border crossings, however, 
might be “classic unintended consequences” of the desire to 
protect potential victims of human trafficking.201 Interviewed 
migrants and immigration officials have indicated that the lower 
rate of deportation of minors over the past few years has indeed 
created the perception that DHS’s deportation policy toward 
UACs has changed.202 
b. Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals 
The second basis cited as a potential reason for the UAC 
surge is DACA—the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals.203 
DACA is an administrative policy issued by DHS in 2012 that 
instructs officials to defer the removal of certain minors who may 
benefit from the previously proposed DREAM Act.204 DACA, 
however, does not apply to minors crossing the border during the 
current surge.205 Studies have suggested that the migratory rates 
of UACs from the Northern Triangle immediately following the 
creation of DACA actually decreased.206 Nevertheless, there have 
been reports that smuggling organizations may be employing 
misinformation about legal remedies, including DACA, to 
convince young migrants to attempt the often dangerous journey 
to the United States.207 The evidence regarding the significance 
of DACA as an incentive to migrate, however, is largely 
anecdotal. 
3. Smuggling Organizations 
Politicians, researchers, and news reports often note the 
possibility that those who facilitate unauthorized border 
crossings or physically take part in smuggling migrants are 
 
 200 Id. § 1232(a)(1). 
 201 Hulse, supra note 198; see also Chishti & Hipsman, supra note 93 (noting the 
potential perception since TVPRA that the United States treats UACs differently).  
 202 Chishti & Hipsman, supra note 93 (providing the reduced deportation rates); 
Robles, supra note 11 (noting the perception). 
 203 UAC Surge Hearing, supra note 12, at 5–6.  
 204 See Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to 
David V. Aguilar, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., Alejandro Mayorkas, 
Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., and John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration 
& Customs Enforcement (June 15, 2012), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/ 
offices/ero/pdf/s1-certain-young-people.pdf. 
 205 Id. 
 206 See Wong, supra note 17, at 4–5. 
 207 Chishti & Hipsman, supra note 93; see also Caitlin Dickson, How Mexico’s Cartels 
Are Behind the Border Kid Crisis, DAILY BEAST (July 9, 2014), http://www.thedaily 
beast.com/articles/2014/06/23/how-mexico-s-cartels-are-behind-the-border-kid-crisis.html; 
Seville & Rappleye, supra note 167. 
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responsible for communicating information that has contributed 
to both surges.208 Unlike the potential causes previously 
discussed, such communications are not a root cause of the surge 
but rather a means to further spread word about the actual and 
perceived changes to law and policy that were previously 
discussed.209 It is in smugglers’ interest to spread word because 
heightened interest in migrating contributes to the industry’s 
multi-billion dollar enterprise and can even help facilitate 
smugglers’ narcotics trade.210 Smuggling organizations often take 
advantage of perceived weaknesses in the entry process and help 
migrants exploit them;211 right now, the credible fear process and 
UAC laws could be perceived as potential weaknesses.212 As to 
why the surge took years to materialize, migration experts have 
suggested that “[i]t took a little time for word to get back to 
Central America and other countries about those protections, as 
well as for criminal organizations to develop smuggling 
infrastructure around them.”213 It is likely that smuggling 
organizations have played some role in facilitating the surge. The 
extent of that role, however, is not readily discernible.  
C.  The Prospect of Immigration Reform 
For both UACs and those claiming to credibly fear 
persecution or torture, another basis could potentially be 
 
 208 See, e.g., Eyder Peralta, Central American Presidents Say U.S. Shares 
Responsibility for Migration Crisis, NPR (July 24, 2014), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-
way/2014/07/24/334942174/central-american-presidents-say-u-s-shares-responsibility-for-
migration-crisis (relaying the President of Honduras’s belief that one of many 
contributors to the surge is “human smugglers telling families in Honduras that they 
could stay in the U.S. if they make it past the border”). 
 209 E. Eduardo Castillo & Christopher Sherman, Migration Spotlights Mexican 
‘Coyote’ Smugglers, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 21, 2014, available at http://big 
story.ap.org/article/migration-spotlights-mexican-coyote-smugglers (noting how some 
have suggested that coyotes help spread word that it is now easier to enter and remain in 
the United States). 
 210 U.N. OFFICE OF DRUGS & CRIME, THE GLOBALIZATION OF CRIME: A 
TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME THREAT ASSESSMENT, at 59, U.N. Sales No. E.10.IV.6 
(2010) (estimating that the annual income for smugglers is $6.6 billion); Dickson, supra 
note 207 (discussing how traffickers use migrants as diversions).  
 211 See Daniel González, Immigrants from India Surge Across Arizona Border, 
REPUBLIC (Sept. 8, 2013), http://www.azcentral.com/news/politics/articles/20130907immi 
gration-arizona-border-indian.html (noting a sharp rise in similar credible fear claims 
that experts believe may be attributable to smuggling organizations). 
 212 See Asylum Surge Hearing, supra note 5, at 186 (statement of Michael J. Fisher, 
Chief, U.S. Border Patrol). 
 213 Suzanne Gamboa, Too Many, Too Fast: Border Children Swamping Agents, NBC 
NEWS (June 9, 2014), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/too-many-too-fast-border-child 
ren-swamping-agents-n126751 (recounting the sentiments of Marc Rosenblum, deputy 
director of the Migration Policy Institute’s U.S. immigration program); see also Asylum 
Fraud Hearing, supra note 186, at 71 (statement of Hipolito M. Acosta, former District 
Director, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services) (discussing the link between UACs, 
smugglers, and drug cartels). 
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contributing to the surge in claims and border crossings: the 
possibility of immigration reform in the near future.214 Many 
migrants might well be aware that current U.S. immigration law 
does not provide them with a legal basis to remain in the United 
States permanently. They may believe, however, that prospective 
immigration reform could provide them with a path to legal 
status. In this respect, they are willing to ride it out and wait to 
see if immigration reform materializes—even though a path to 
legal status may be premised on a certain length of continuous 
residence in the United States that they likely cannot satisfy.215  
D.  Border Security and Fraud 
Some appear to partially attribute the surge to perceived lax 
security at the southwestern border.216 The data, however, does 
not support this claim. Border enforcement spending has 
increased, as have the number of border patrol agents.217 More 
importantly though, credible fear claimants and UACs do not 
typically try to evade border patrol agents.218 Consequently, 
while many of the above-discussed potential causes may have 
impacted the surge, perceived lax border security does not appear 
to be a relevant factor. 
Conversely, and seemingly paradoxically, some have 
partially attributed the surge to heightened enforcement efforts 
at the border.219 The premise is that a larger border patrol 
presence has caused migrants to seek alternate means to gain 
entry to the United States. For credible fear claimants, the 
government’s increased use of expedited removal could cause 
more migrants to allege a fear of persecution or torture, since a 
credible claim provides one of the only means at migrants’ 
disposal to avoid deportation when they are otherwise subject to 
expedited removal.220  
 
 214 Jim Dwyer, A 12-Year-Old’s Trek of Despair Ends in a Noose at the Border, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 20, 2014, at A1 (“The prospect of immigration reform in the United States is 
also enticing . . . because of the belief that anyone already in the country illegally will be 
allowed to stay.”). 
 215 For example, the proposed 2013 Senate bill would only authorize a path to 
citizenship for certain unauthorized immigrants who resided in the United States before 
December 31, 2011.  
 216 See, e.g., UAC Surge Hearing, supra note 12, at 2; see also DAN RESTREPO & ANN 
GARCIA, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, THE SURGE OF UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN FROM 
CENTRAL AMERICA: ROOT CAUSES AND POLICY SOLUTIONS 3 (2014) (recounting the border 
security argument proffered by several lawmakers).  
 217 See U.S. BORDER PATROL, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., BORDER PATROL AGENT 
STAFFING BY FISCAL YEAR (2013), available at http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/docu 
ments/U.S. Border Patrol Fiscal Year Staffing Statistics 1992-2013.pdf. 
 218 See Preston, supra note 165. 
 219 See HRF, HOW TO PROTECT REFUGEES, supra note 78, at 1. 
 220 See Asylum Surge Hearing, supra note 5, at 143 (statement of ACLU et al.). 
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This potential cause raises numerous questions about the 
meaning and extent of “fraud” in the surge. Critics of the current 
surge often allege rampant fraud, stating that migrants 
“abuse”221 and “game the system.”222 But are these migrants 
committing fraud? There are several categories that have to be 
distinguished. First are those who take advantage of U.S. laws 
and policies that apply to them and plan to pursue their claims in 
accordance with the law. For example, if a prospective migrant 
fears, or has experienced, unspeakable harm in his home country 
and learns of a process that can more readily allow him to stay in 
the United States on the basis of this harm, he is not engaged in 
fraud simply because he takes advantage. Second are those who 
have no viable claim and purposefully choose to game the 
process. For example, some internal CBP reports allege “Mexican 
drug cartel members are abusing the credible fear process to 
bypass regular immigration checks in order [to] get into the 
country.”223 Other reports have noted how gang members are 
trying to enter the United States as UACs.224 Migrants falling 
within the second category are unequivocally committing fraud.  
There are many other categories between these two 
extremes. Some migrants have experienced hardships in their 
home countries, but their experiences may not unequivocally fit 
within a legally permissible box, so they alter their stories. 
Others might have viable claims that could permit them to 
remain in the United States, but they have no intention to 
adhere to the requirements the law imposes on them. Indeed, a 
percentage of migrants released into the country do not show up 
for their subsequent immigration hearings.225 There are many 
derivations of the above-mentioned categories.  
To be sure, a certain amount of fraud is typically a byproduct 
of any government program.226 Accurate data on the extent of 
 
 221 Id. at 6 (statement of Rep. Jason Chaffetz). 
 222 Id. at 3 (statement of Rep. Bob Goodlatte). 
 223 Id. at 6 (statement of Rep. Jason Chaffetz); see id. at 186 (statement of Rep. Ted 
Poe); see also id. at 3 (statement of Rep. Bob Goodlatte) (recounting reports that claimants 
are being coached to game the system). 
 224 James Bargent, Flood of Child Migrants into US Could Include MS13 Gang 
Members, INSIGHT CRIME (July 14, 2014), http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/flood-
of-child-migrants-into-us-could-include-ms13-gang-members.  
 225 Chishti & Hipsman, supra note 93 (“[A]n estimated 30 percent of unaccompanied 
minors are ordered removed in absentia because they fail to appear at their initial or later 
hearings.”). 
 226 See Asylum Surge Hearing, supra note 5, at 191 (statement of Rep. Luis V. 
Gutierrez) (noting that the government would not end unemployment compensation 
simply because there are instances of fraud); see also Asylum Fraud Hearing, supra note 
186, at 11 (statement of Louis D. Crocetti, Jr., Principal, Immigration Integrity Group) 
(noting that internal DHS studies found conclusive evidence of fraud in about 12% of 
cases). 
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actual fraud as a contributor to the surge, however, is not 
currently available.227 To illustrate, conservative news outlets 
have purportedly obtained from immigration agents “cheat 
sheets” near the border that provide migrants with lists of 
commonly asked questions and suggested answers to make out a 
viable claim.228 Determining the authenticity of such documents, 
however, is difficult to do. Although it purportedly came from a 
federal law enforcement official, there appears to be infighting 
within DHS components that is leading to the dissemination of 
contradictory information.229 This infighting, along with DHS’s 
general reluctance to make public information regarding ongoing 
investigations or politically sensitive topics, undermines the 
ability to accurately assess the data. Thus, this Article’s causal 
conclusions in Part IV are premised on the concession that a 
greater understanding of the extent of any fraud could alter the 
calculus.230  
IV. ASSESSMENT OF COLLECTIVE CAUSES  
This Article concludes that the word of mouth effect and, to a 
lesser extent, changes in country conditions in the Northern 
Triangle, have primarily caused the surge in crossings by 
credible fear claimants and UACs. Regarding the country 
conditions in the Northern Triangle, economic and crime data 
certainly paint a bleak picture,231 but the region-wide data does 
not itself indicate that the overall circumstances deteriorated 
significantly around the time of the surge. For instance, the 
murder rates in Guatemala actually decreased as the United 
States began to record a spike in credible fear claims.232 
Regarding Salvadorians, credible fear referral rates remained 
 
 227 See Asylum Surge Hearing, supra note 5, at 5 (statement of Rep. Zoe Lofgren) 
(noting the inability to decipher at this stage whether fraud is responsible for the surge).  
 228 See Sara Carter, This Is a ‘Cheat Sheet’ Found at the Border to Coach Illegals on 
How to Stay in the U.S., BLAZE (June 26, 2014), http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2014/06/ 
26/this-is-a-cheat-sheet-found-at-the-border-to-coach-illegals-on-how-to-stay-in-the-u-s/. 
 229 See, e.g., Asylum Surge Hearing, supra note 5, at 178–79 (statement of Michael J. 
Fisher, Chief, U.S. Border Patrol) (disputing the National Border Patrol Council’s 
assessment of agency policy on certain matters). 
 230 As a final point on potential causes, it appears that apprehension rates are not a 
contributing factor. Ruth Ellen Wasem of the Congressional Research Service noted that 
apprehension rates of migrants from the Northern Triangle were also high in 2005, but 
there was no accompanying surge in claims. Asylum Surge Hearing, supra note 5, at 
69−70. 
 231 See WORLD BANK, DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGE, supra note 105, at 4–9; see also 
UNODC, Homicide Stats, supra note 107.  
 232 UNODC, Homicide Stats, supra note 107 (listing the murder rates in the Northern 
Triangle countries from 2006 through 2012); Asylum Surge Hearing, supra note 5, at 227; 
see supra Table 1 (providing credible fear referral data); supra Table 3 (listing the murder 
rates in the Northern Triangle countries from 2006 through 2012).  
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relatively low in 2010 and 2011, even though El Salvador’s 
homicide rate was consistently high during the preceding 
years.233 
Nevertheless, despite the countrywide data on countries in 
the Northern Triangle, there are several signs of deteriorating 
conditions on the ground around the time of the surges. First, 
there are indications that the situation has gotten worse for 
certain segments of the population such as children.234 
Researchers who have studied migratory patterns have found 
that a younger age significantly correlates to expressed 
intentions to migrate, which would impact both UACs and 
credible fear claimants.235 Second, the hometowns and regions 
from which many migrants fled have murder rates well above the 
country averages, which supports the conclusion that 
inter-country regional crime distinctions can trump national 
figures or exacerbate their deleterious consequences.236  
Third, there are indications that gangs and other criminal 
entities are accumulating more territory, which decreases 
citizens’ ability to relocate internally.237 Fourth, since the 
beginning of the surge, migrants from Northern Triangle 
countries have requested asylum from countries other than the 
United States at a higher rate.238 If migrants’ reasons for 
departing their home countries were solely attributable to U.S. 
policy rather than country conditions, then one would not expect 
a concurrent spike in asylum requests in other countries.239 Fifth, 
there is some indication that fluctuations in murder rates 
correlate with migrants subject to expedited removal expressing 
a fear of persecution. For example, the credible fear data depicts 
a noticeable increase in Salvadorian claimants subsequent to the 
apparent failing of the truce between rival gangs.240 The failure 
 
 233 USCIS 2011 CREDIBLE FEAR STATISTICS, supra note 123. 
 234 See UNHCR, Children on the Run, supra note 147, at 24. 
 235 Hiskey et al., supra note 139, at 5. The researchers, however, have only found a 
correlation for children sixteen and older, which shows that other factors account for the 
rise in border crossings by minors who are younger than sixteen. Id. 
 236 Gonzalez-Barrera et al., supra note 130; see also INTERNACIONAL CTR. FOR THE 
HUMAN RIGHTS OF MIGRANTS, supra note 128, at 15–26; Lind, supra note 130. 
 237 INTERNACIONAL CTR. FOR THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF MIGRANTS, supra note 128, at 24. 
 238 UNHCR, Children on the Run, supra note 147, at 15 (reporting a 432% increase in 
neighboring countries since 2009); see also UAC Surge Hearing, supra note 12, at 47 
(statement of Mark Seitz, Bishop of the Diocese of El Paso, Texas, U.S. Conference of 
Catholic Bishops) (noting that since 2008, there has been a 712% increase in asylum 
claims filed by Northern Triangle citizens in countries that surround the Northern 
Triangle).  
 239 Unless, of course, a change in the pull factors in these countries around the time 
of the surge also incentivized prospective asylum seekers to attempt to migrate there. 
 240 USCIS 2014 CREDIBLE FEAR STATISTICS, supra note 9; USCIS 2013 CREDIBLE 
FEAR STATISTICS, supra note 132. 
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of the truce also correlates with the rise in claims by Salvadorian 
UACs (though not at a level that significantly distinguishes it 
from other Northern Triangle countries).241  
Sixth, unlike the official national murder rates in the region, 
the data on countrywide perceptions of insecurity since the time 
of the surge appear to correlate with the rate at which migrants 
claim to fear persecution if returned to their home countries.242 
Referring back to the homicide data, unlike in Honduras, the 
murder rate in El Salvador reportedly decreased from 2011 to 
2012.243 Nevertheless, since the time when credible fear claims 
began to spike, El Salvador has consistently been the primary 
country of origin for individuals subject to expedited removal who 
claim to fear persecution or torture.244 At the same time, El 
Salvador is the only country in the Northern Triangle where 
citizens’ perceptions of insecurity did not decrease when the 
surge began.245 Thus, the connection between the number of 
claimants at the border and perceptions of insecurity support the 
conclusion that a security deterioration may have contributed to 
the rise in claims. Regarding this sixth point, there are, however, 
additional factors that may also contribute to the particularly 
high number of Salvadorian claims. For instance, there is a 
strong connection between remittance networks and intentions to 
migrate.246 As noted above, El Salvador is also the country with 
the highest remittance rate—a staggering one-third of the 
country.247 Other Northern Triangle countries also have high 
remittance rates.248  
More generally, considering the six aforementioned signs 
collectively, the data does point to several circumstances that 
changed around the time of the surge, which demonstrates that 
country conditions have played a role in the escalation. While 
security concerns are undoubtedly a contributing factor, family 
reunification and depressed economic conditions fully or partially 
 
 241 See Southwest Border Unaccompanied Alien Children, supra note 10.  
 242 This correlation, however, does not apply as readily to the surge in UAC 
claimants. See id. 
 243 UNODC, Homicide Stats, supra note 107. 
 244 See, e.g., USCIS 2014 CREDIBLE FEAR STATISTICS, supra note 9 (reporting that in 
some months Salvadorians had nearly three times as many credible fear referrals as 
claimants from the next country on the list). 
 245 Hiskey et al., supra note 139, at 3. 
 246 Id. at 5 (reviewing the “friends and family effect”). 
 247 Villalobos, supra note 109, at 69.  
 248 See Daniel Reichman, Honduras: The Perils of Remittance Dependence and 
Clandestine Migration, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Apr. 11, 2013), http://www.migr 
ationpolicy.org/article/honduras-perils-remittance-dependence-and-clandestine-migration 
(noting that 17% of Honduras’s economy is based on remittances).  
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motivated some migrants to leave the Northern Triangle, 
particularly those coming from Guatemala.249 
While country conditions have likely contributed to the 
surge, those who claim they are solely responsible for the rise in 
these particular types of claims are incorrect.250 The conditions in 
the Northern Triangle are simply not analogous to situations in 
countries such as Syria, where the destabilization of the 
government and escalation in violence caused millions to flee the 
country irrespective of the conditions that awaited them in 
refugee camps.251 Rather, the word of mouth effect appears to 
have impacted the migratory spike for credible fear claimants 
and UACs. 
Starting with the rise in credible fear claimants, this Article 
reviewed several potential reasons why word has spread in the 
Northern Triangle that migrants could more easily obtain 
permission to enter the United States: increased credible fear 
grant rates, decreased detention rates, the characterizations of 
credible fear grant benefits by smugglers and others, and higher 
asylum grant rates. The high credible fear grant rates since the 
time of the surge do not, in and of themselves, appear to provide 
a significant basis to account for the rise in claims. As mentioned 
above, comparably high grant rates in the past did not result in 
concurrent spikes in claims.252  
The credible fear grant rates, however, were substantially 
lower for several years prior to the rise in claims.253 Thus, the 
rise in the grant rate could be a contributing factor, particularly 
because the grant rate was notably low for certain Northern 
Triangle claimants prior to the escalation.254 For the rising grant 
rate to be impactful, however, claimants must actually obtain 
asylum (or related relief) or be released during the pendency of 
 
 249 For example, a significant percentage of children interviewed by the U.N. listed 
“family or opportunity” as a reason why they decided to leave. UNHCR, Children on the 
Run, supra note 147, at 7–10. The data shows that children from Guatemala, in 
particular, are much more likely to migrate because of family or greater opportunities 
than violence in society. Id. at 10. 
 250 See Wong, supra note 17, at 1. 
 251 See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Syria Regional Refugee Response, 
http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php (last updated Aug. 21, 2014) (stating 
that approximately 3 million refugees have fled Syria since 2012); see also Miguel 
Almaguer & Elisha Fieldstadt, Is Trek of Undocumented Immigrant Children Safer than 
Staying Home?, NBC NEWS (July 6, 2014), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/immi 
gration-border-crisis/trek-undocumented-immigrant-children-safer-staying-home-n149151 
(“Countries surrounding Syria have welcomed 2.5 million refugees, but ‘we get 90 
thousand immigrant children and we start talking about expedited removal.’”).  
 252 Asylum Surge Hearing, supra note 5, at 227.  
 253 Id. 
 254 Id. at 70 (statement of Ruth Ellen Wasem, Congressional Research Service). 
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their claims; otherwise, a favorable credible fear determination 
would produce little inherent benefit. Regarding the asylum 
relief issue, the data produced in Table 5 demonstrates that 
adjudicators consistently grant very few asylum claims filed by 
Northern Triangle applicants. Accordingly, the grant rate would 
not produce any perceived inherent benefit.  
As to the detention issue, migrants could be incentivized by 
the belief that the government would not detain them or would, 
at the very least, quickly release them into the country. Absent 
misinformation, migrants would not believe DHS would release 
them if DHS detained individuals found to have a credible fear of 
persecution during the pendency of their claims. Thus, it appears 
that the primary significance of the rise in grant rates may be 
inexorably linked to the significance of any change in detention 
policy. (To say that detention rates may be a contributing cause 
is quite different than advocating for increased detention, and by 
analyzing the former this Article is by no means advocating the 
latter.) The link between U.S. detention policies and migration 
rates has some historical backing. For instance, immigration 
officials working in South Texas in the 1980s noted how a similar 
surge in border crossings immediately followed the government’s 
decision to “institute[] a policy of releasing on recognizance aliens 
from Central America who claimed they were fleeing violence 
and persecution in their homeland.”255 In 2005, DHS 
implemented a policy of detaining Brazilians crossing the 
southwest border without authorization and the rate of migration 
by Brazilian nationals dropped considerably.256 
Regarding the current surge, the data does suggest some 
changes in detention policy. There is undoubtedly a greater 
chance that DHS will release arriving aliens because of the 
Morton Memo.257 For detention more generally, in recent years 
the rates of release have been high and the average length of 
detention has been relatively short.258 As previously noted, 
however, the release rates and lengths of detention are not 
historically anomalous, which cautions against attributing to 
them freestanding blame for the surge, wholly divorced from 
other converging factors.259 Nevertheless, the data does appear to 
 
 255 Asylum Fraud Hearing, supra note 186, at 28 (statement of Hipolito M. Acosta, 
former District Director, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services).  
 256 Asylum Surge Hearing, supra note 5, at 64 (statement of Rep. Bob Goodlatte) 
(recounting the sentiments of former DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff).  
 257 Id. at 107 (statement of U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom) 
(noting that in FY 2012, 80% of eligible claimants received parole).  
 258 See, e.g., Asylum Fraud Hearing, supra note 186, at 136; ICE 2009 & 2010 
DETENTION STATISTICS, supra note 186, at 44. 
 259 See, e.g., ICE 2006 DETENTION STATISTICS, supra note 188, at 34. 
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show that detention standards were somewhat relaxed after FY 
2007, and this relaxation, combined with detention policy 
changes for arriving aliens and increased credible fear grant 
rates, could have all converged to impact external perception. 
Indeed, regarding the current situation, the administration 
appears to concede that its detention practices have likely 
contributed to the current surge in migrants from Central 
America.260  
Unclear, however, is the extent of smugglers’ role in 
facilitating migrants’ perceptions about the credible fear process. 
Their role could be limited. Conversely, smugglers could have 
more regularly spread word that the United States significantly 
relaxed its detention practices for credible fear claimants based 
on a misunderstanding of the limited scope of the Morton Memo. 
Further still, smugglers could have intentionally misinformed 
migrants about U.S. detention practices to convince them to 
incur the cost of migrating—deteriorating country conditions 
would more readily entice prospective migrants to embark 
northward.261 Actual and perceived descriptions of the credible 
fear process by politicians, news outlets, and others could also be 
contributing factors.262 In short, a credible fear screening 
standard that is necessarily low appears to have converged with 
several factors to produce the word of mouth effect for credible 
fear claims. These factors include relaxed detention standards 
generally, detention policy changes for arriving aliens, credible 
fear grant rates that rose after historically low levels, and groups 
that facilitate the dissemination of real and perceived changes to 
the credible fear process. 
As to the UAC surge, perceptions about changes to law and 
policy appear to more concretely account for the word of mouth 
effect. As noted above, TVRPA has been cited as a reason why 
UACs have migrated to the United States in greater numbers. 
TVRPA did change the law in a manner that applies to UACs 
currently crossing the border,263 and the repatriation rate has 
declined since FY 2008.264 Reports indicate that these actual 
changes, combined with a general administrative policy to defer 
UAC deportations, have indeed contributed to the word of mouth 
 
 260 Preston, supra note 165 (quoting Cecilia Muñoz, director of the White House 
Domestic Policy Council).  
 261 Some smugglers, however, depend on referrals, which may dissuade them to 
intentionally provide false information.  
 262 See HRF, HOW TO PROTECT REFUGEES, supra note 78, at 17. 
 263 See 8 U.S.C. § 1232 (2012). 
 264 See Chishti & Hipsman, supra note 93. 
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effect.265 In this respect, TVRPA’s causal relevance is not that 
people are necessarily aware of the Act by name, but rather that 
they are aware of the changes in detention and deportation 
practices that can partially be attributed to TVRPA.266 Smugglers 
appear to have contributed to prospective migrants’ heightened 
awareness,267 but, for the reasons already discussed, the precise 
extent of their role is uncertain. The impact of TVRPA on 
migration levels is particularly notable because the law favors 
placing UACs with friends or family.268 Researchers have noted a 
strong correlation between intentions to migrate and “individuals 
who have migrant friends or relatives already living abroad.”269 
Most UACs have family members or family friends in the United 
States with whom they plan to reside;270 many acknowledged 
that family reunification was a reason why they decided to 
migrate.271  
Unlike TVRPA, DACA does not directly apply to UACs who 
recently migrated. The DACA program, however, has been an 
alleged catalyst for UACs to migrate to the United States.272 
Assessing the relevance of DACA requires unpacking two distinct 
issues. The first is whether DACA incentivizes UACs to travel to 
the United States because these UACs believe DACA applies to 
them. While not definitive, the decrease in overall apprehension 
rates in the months following the creation of DACA could support 
the conclusion that UACs do not believe DACA applies to 
them.273 Nevertheless, there could very well have been lag time 
 
 265 See Ron Allen, Fate for Most Kids Who Cross the Border? Staying in the U.S., NBC 
NEWS (July 14, 2014), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/immigration-border-crisis/fate-
most-kids-who-cross-border-staying-u-s-n153706 (observing in immigration court that no 
UACs “appear[] to be ordered out of the country any time soon”); Robles, supra note 11 
(reporting that TVRPA has led to fewer deportations of minors, and immigration officials 
in the Northern Triangle took note); Hulse, supra note 198 (noting that the 
administration believes that TVRPA “is partly responsible for tying its hands in dealing 
with the current influx of children”); see also Brian Bennett, Deportation Data Won’t 
Dispel Rumors Drawing Migrant Minors to U.S., L.A. TIMES (July 5, 2014), 
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-deport-children-20140706-story.html#page=1. 
 266 But see Wong, supra note 17, at 5–6 (arguing that TVRPA has not contributed to 
the surge).  
 267 See Peralta, supra note 208.  
 268 See 8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(2).  
 269 Hiskey et al., supra note 139, at 5. 
 270 See, e.g., Chishti & Hipsman, supra note 93 (“Ninety percent of [UACs] are 
released by ORR into the care of a parent, relative, or family friend . . . .”); Hannah 
Rappleye, Undocumented and Unaccompanied: Facts, Figures on Children at the Border, 
NBC NEWS (July 9, 2014), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/immigration-border-crisis/ 
undocumented-unaccompanied-facts-figures-children-border-n152221 (estimating that 
eighty-five percent of UACs “are reunified with their immediate or extended families”). 
 271 UNHCR, Children on the Run, supra note 147, at 7–10. 
 272 UAC Surge Hearing, supra note 12, at 18–20 (statement of Ronald D. Vitiello, 
Deputy Chief, U.S. Border Patrol). 
 273 See Wong, supra note 17, at 4. 
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between the administration’s announcement of the program and 
UACs’ (or their families’) decision to act on that information. 
Additionally, UACs might believe that DACA applies to them 
because numerous reports indicate that smuggling rings are 
disseminating inaccurate information.274 Reviews of Central 
American news coverage of DACA, however, indicate that the 
coverage has accurately explained the applicability of the 
program.275 Unsurprisingly then, reports have not indicated that 
migrants list DACA’s applicability to them as a reason why they 
chose to migrate; rather, migrants are more likely to refer to a 
general belief that they can obtain a permit—or permiso—to 
stay.276  
More germane, perhaps, is the second reason why DACA 
may be relevant: it fosters greater migration not based on its 
applicability to recent UACs, but rather because of what it 
represents. Specifically, DACA provides an indication that U.S. 
immigration policies might provide to future categories of 
unauthorized immigrants additional opportunities for reprieve 
from deportation (or possibly a legal means to stay). In this 
respect, DACA is part of the general immigration reform 
uncertainty that could, quite understandably, further incentivize 
prospective migrants to come to the United States. It is highly 
unlikely that DACA itself is responsible for the surge, which is 
why it is necessary to look at all the potential factors collectively. 
In this respect, the prospect of future reprieve that DACA 
represents must be considered against the backdrop of dire 
country conditions in the Northern Triangle and U.S. laws and 
policies that do actually decrease the chances of expedient 
deportation. 
Considering all the factors likely contributing to the surge, it 
appears that as a general matter, the climate of violence, 
insecurity, and depressed economic opportunities in the Northern 
Triangle is the powder keg and, along with certain indications of 
worsening conditions, the word of mouth effect has provided the 
spark.277 The following anecdote aptly illustrates this conclusion:  
 
 274 Chishti & Hipsman, supra note 93; Dickson, supra note 207; Seville & Rappleye, 
supra note 167.  
 275 Roque Planas, Don’t Blame Central American Newspapers for Influx of 
Undocumented Children, HUFFINGTON POST (June 12, 2014), http://www.huffington 
post.com/2014/06/12/central-america-daca_n_5488329.html. 
 276 Preston, supra note 165; see also Seville & Rappleye, supra note 167; Semple, 
supra note 167. 
 277 Against the backdrop of all these factors are the general reasons why people want 
to migrate to the United States—such as family reunification and greater opportunity—
and the established migratory networks in the Northern Triangle that facilitate 
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At the church, some women said the talk about an entry permit, 
which has intensified in the last two months, had prompted them to 
set out on the risk-filled journey across Mexico. But the women said 
they were moved mainly by desperate worries about their children, 
with poverty unrelenting in their countries and warring street gangs 
expanding their control.278 
Although the migrants in this illustration indicate that 
deplorable country conditions were their main reason for leaving 
the Northern Triangle, the powder keg/spark analogy 
encapsulates the causes of the surge better than attempts to 
assign specific percentages to each contributing factor.  
To be sure, while the powder keg/spark analogy might 
represent the general phenomenon that appears to account for 
the surge, it would be overly simplistic to assume that the factors 
driving all migrants during the surge are uniform. Delving into 
individual cases would undoubtedly yield a range of divergent 
circumstances.279 Certain migrants would have traveled to the 
United States even if they did not hear about any changes in 
policy. Others living in less violent regions could be opportunists 
who want to take advantage of the perceived changes in policy. 
Some of these opportunists could have nefarious intentions while 
others simply desire to reunify with family or pursue greater 
economic and educational opportunities.280 And of course, there 
are others with legitimate bases for seeking refuge who never 
make it to the United States because of the dangerous journey 
and the nefarious actions of smuggling rings who take advantage 
of migrants when they are most vulnerable. The amalgamation of 
these divergent circumstances is an inevitable byproduct of the 
country conditions in the Northern Triangle and U.S. 
immigration policy.  
CONCLUSION 
This Article has shown how Northern Triangle country 
conditions, U.S. immigration policy, and smuggling organizations 
collectively created the surge in credible fear claimants and 
UACs. How the United States should respond to the surge is a 
question beyond the scope of this Article. Nevertheless, one 
 
migration. Hiskey et al., supra note 139, at 5 (noting the link between migratory networks 
and intentions to migrate). 
 278 Preston, supra note 165. 
 279 See UNHCR, Children on the Run, supra note 147, at 7–11 (reviewing the results 
of its interviews with UACs); see also Semple, supra note 167 (recounting the multitude of 
reasons UACs expressed for leaving their home countries).  
 280 See Asylum Surge Hearing, supra note 5, at 3, 6, 186 (attributing nefarious 
intentions to some migrants, including drug cartel members who may attempt to take 
advantage of the asylum process).  
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potential response is worth mentioning because it should not be 
contentious: substantially increasing adjudicatory capacity. 
There has been a significant increase in resources provided for 
enforcement efforts.281 Conversely, the number of immigration 
judges tasked with adjudicating immigration cases has remained 
fairly stagnant.282 The extraordinary imbalance creates a 
bottleneck in the system and causes cases to languish for 
significant periods of time.283 From a humanitarian perspective, 
greater funding for immigration judges would decrease the 
length of detention for some migrants. For those who believe that 
the years migrants often spend in limbo while their cases pend is 
a security risk, shorter wait times would help alleviate that 
concern. Even from an economic perspective, shorter detentions 
and monitoring responsibilities would offset the resources needed 
to hire additional immigration judges. In short, increased 
funding for immigration judges and other adjudicators should be 
a no-brainer.  
As noted repeatedly, the conclusions reached in this Article 
are based on the available data. Unfortunately, however, the 
available data is incomplete. Generally, DHS does make 
publically available a considerable amount of 
immigration-related data. The agency, however, does not 
consistently provide to the public the panoply of immigration 
data at its disposal, nor does it always disseminate in a timely 
manner the data that it does provide. Aside from disseminating 
that which is at its disposal, DHS is also not taking advantage of 
the extent of immigration data it could be collecting and 
analyzing. The agency should significantly increase its database 
capabilities and coding practices to allow enhanced research into 
migratory patterns and other immigration-related issues. DHS 
should also create a central location where all this data is 
published rather than having it spread throughout the websites 
of various agency components. Providing researchers with 
accurate, robust, and easily obtainable data would help inform 
policy. 
The current surge and the rhetoric surrounding it are an apt 
illustration of the importance of more fully understanding the 
root causes of migration. Policymakers and other stakeholders 
would be well-served to observe how recurrent push and pull 
factors influence migratory patterns. Without a greater 
 
 281 See, e.g., U.S. BORDER PATROL, supra note 217. 
 282 See Office of the Chief Immigration Judge, supra note 63. 
 283 OFFICE OF PLANNING, ANALYSIS & TECH., supra note 64, at A2, W1. 
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understanding of the causes of migration, future legislative and 
policy decisions will inevitably lead to unintended consequences.  
 
 
 
